The Internet consists of independent networks that belong to different administrative domains and vary in scope from personal area networks, private home networks, corporate networks to ISP and global operator networks. These networks may employ different technologies, communications mediums, addressing realms and may have widely different capabilities. The coming years will add a significant level of dynamic behavior, such as mobile nodes and moving networks, which the Internet must support. At the same time, there is a need to address the increasing levels of harmful traffic and denial-of-service attacks. The existing Internet architecture does not support dynamic behavior or secure communication to a sufficient degree. This paper outlines a node-identity-based internetworking architecture that allows heterogeneous networks to work together without loss of functionality. Some of techniques employed in this architecture include reliance on cryptographic node identifiers, identity routers and localized addressing realms.

In the Mobile IPv6 protocol, the mobile node sends binding updates to its correspondents to inform them about its current location. It is well-known that the origin of this location information must be authenticated. This paper discusses several threats created by location management that go beyond unauthentic location data. In particular, the attacker can redirect data to bomb third parties and induce unnecessary authentication. We introduce and analyze protection mechanisms with focus on ones that work for all Internet nodes and do not need a PKI or other new security infrastructure. Our threat analysis and assessment of the defense mechanisms formed the basis for the design of a secure location management protocol for Mobile IPv6. Many of the same threats should be considered when designing any location management mechanism for open networks.