In this paper, we develop an approximation scheme for solving bilevel programs with equilibrium constraints, which are generally difficult to solve. Among other things, calculating the first-order derivative in such a problem requires differentiation across the hierarchy, which is computationally intensive, if not prohibitive. To bypass the hierarchy, we propose to bound such bilevel programs, equivalent to multiple-followers Stackelberg games, with two new hierarchy-free problems: a $T$-step Cournot game and a $T$-step monopoly model. Since they are standard equilibrium or optimization problems, both can be efficiently solved via first-order methods. Importantly, we show that the bounds provided by these problems — the upper bound by the $T$-step Cournot game and the lower bound by the $T$-step monopoly model — can be made arbitrarily tight by increasing the step parameter $T$ for a wide range of problems. We prove that a small $T$ usually suffices under appropriate conditions to reach an approximation acceptable for most practical purposes. Eventually, the analytical insights are highlighted through numerical examples.

In a Markov decision process (MDP), an agent interacts with the environment via perceptions and actions. During this process, the agent aims to maximize its own gain. Hence, appropriate regulations are often required, if we hope to take the external costs/benefits of its actions into consideration. In this paper, we study how to regulate such an agent by redesigning model parameters that can affect the rewards and/or the transition kernels. We formulate this problem as a bilevel program, in which the lower-level MDP is regulated by the upper-level model designer. To solve the resulting problem, we develop a scheme that allows the designer to iteratively predict the agent’s reaction by solving the MDP and then adaptively update model parameters based on the predicted reaction. The algorithm is first theoretically analyzed and then empirically tested on several MDP models arising in economics and robotics.

To regulate a social system comprised of self-interested agents, economic incentives are often required to induce a desirable outcome. This incentive design problem naturally possesses a bilevel structure, in which a designer modifies the payoffs of the agents with incentives while anticipating the response of the agents, who play a non-cooperative game that converges to an equilibrium. The existing bilevel optimization algorithms raise a dilemma when applied to this problem: anticipating how incentives affect the agents at equilibrium requires solving the equilibrium problem repeatedly, which is computationally inefficient; bypassing the time-consuming step of equilibrium-finding can reduce the computational cost, but may lead the designer to a sub-optimal solution. To address such a dilemma, we propose a method that tackles the designer’s and agents’ problems simultaneously in a single loop. Specifically, at each iteration, both the designer and the agents only move one step. Nevertheless, we allow the designer to gradually learn the overall influence of the incentives on the agents, which guarantees optimality after convergence. The convergence rate of the proposed scheme is also established for a broad class of games.

In a social system, the self-interest of agents can be detrimental to the collective good, sometimes leading to social dilemmas. To resolve such a conflict, a central designer may intervene by either redesigning the system or incentivizing the agents to change their behaviors. To be effective, the designer must anticipate how the agents react to the intervention, which is dictated by their often unknown payoff functions. Therefore, learning about the agents is a prerequisite for intervention. In this paper, we provide a unified framework for learning and intervention in games. We cast the equilibria of games as individual layers and integrate them into an end-to-end optimization framework. To enable the backward propagation through the equilibria of games, we propose two approaches, respectively based on explicit and implicit differentiation. Specifically, we cast the equilibria as the solutions to variational inequalities (VIs). The explicit approach unrolls the projection method for solving VIs, while the implicit approach exploits the sensitivity of the solutions to VIs. At the core of both approaches is the differentiation through a projection operator. Moreover, we establish the correctness of both approaches and identify the conditions under which one approach is more desirable than the other. The analytical results are validated using several real-world problems.

As one of the most promising communication technologies in vehicular networks, LTE V2X related technical specifications are released in Release 14 by 3GPP in 2017. In the newest specifications, the LTE V2X can work with or without eNBs, namely LTE-V-Cell and LTE-V-Direct. In this study, we focus on the media access process of LTE-V-Direct. First, we proposed a model to describe the MAC process of LTE-V-Direct, and based on that model, we derived the Frame Information Loss Rate and Inter-Reception Gap of LTE-V-Direct. Then, we designed a simulation to verify the model. By comparing the simulation result and numerical result of the model, the correctness and precision of the model is verified.