Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page
Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert

Sidney C. Clark

dblp:96/3139 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 1987
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 50% Network security · 50%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Logic in computer science · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › protocol security
protocol vulnerability discovery		 0.011987
The Interrogator: Protocol Security Analysis · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
security protocol analysis		 0.011987
The Interrogator: Protocol Security Analysis · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Logic in computer science
logic programming		 0.011987
The Interrogator: Protocol Security Analysis · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Logic in computer science › logic programming
prolog		 0.011987
The Interrogator: Protocol Security Analysis · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

prolog · 0.0formal specification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1987 The Interrogator: Protocol Security Analysis
abstract
The Interrogator is a Prolog program that searches for security vulnerabilities in network protocols for automatic cryptographic key distribution. Given a formal specification of the protocol, it looks for message modification attacks that defeat the protocol objective. It is still under developement, but is has been able to rediscover a known vulnerability in a published protocol. It is implemented in LM-Prolog on a Lisp Machine, with a graphical user interface.
Jonathan K. Millen, Sidney C. Clark, Sheryl B. Freedman
 IEEE Trans. Software Eng.2