Certified defenses promise provable robustness guarantees. We study the malicious exploitation of probabilistic certification frameworks to better understand the limits of guarantee provisions. Now, the objective is to not only mislead a classifier, but also to manipulate the certification process to generate a robustness guarantee for an adversarial input—certificate spoofing. A recent study in ICLR demonstrated that crafting large perturbations can shift inputs far into regions capable of generating a certificate for an incorrect class. Our study investigates if perturbations are needed to cause a misclassification and yet coax a certified model into issuing a deceptive, large robustness radius for a target class can still be made small and imperceptible. We explore the idea of region-focused adversarial examples to craft imperceptible perturbations, spoof certificates and achieve certification radii larger than the source class—ghost certificates. Extensive evaluations with the ImageNet demonstrate the ability to effectively bypass state-of-the-art certified defenses such as Densepure. Our work underscores the need to better understand the limits of robustness certification methods.

Concept erasure has emerged as a promising technique for mitigating the risk of harmful content generation in diffusion models by selectively unlearning undesirable concepts. The common principle of previous works to remove a specific concept is to map it to a fixed generic concept, such as a neutral concept or just an empty text prompt. In this paper, we demonstrate that this fixed-target strategy is suboptimal, as it fails to account for the impact of erasing one concept on the others. To address this limitation, we model the concept space as a graph and empirically analyze the effects of erasing one concept on the remaining concepts. Our analysis uncovers intriguing geometric properties of the concept space, where the influence of erasing a concept is confined to a local region. Building on this insight, we propose the Adaptive Guided Erasure (AGE) method, which dynamically selects optimal target concepts tailored to each undesirable concept, minimizing unintended side effects. Experimental results show that AGE significantly outperforms state-of-the-art erasure methods on preserving unrelated concepts while maintaining effective erasure performance. Our code is published at {https://github.com/tuananhbui89/Adaptive-Guided-Erasure}.

Deep learning system components are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Detectors are no exception. Detectors, in contrast to classifiers, possess unique characteristics, architecturally and in task execution; often operating in challenging conditions, for instance, detecting traffic signs in autonomous cars. But, our knowledge dominates attacks against classifiers and tests in the "digital domain".To address this critical gap, we conducted an extensive empirical study targeting multiple detector architectures and two challenging detection tasks in real-world settings: traffic signs and vehicles. Using diverse, methodically collected videos captured from driving cars and flying drones, incorporating physical object trigger deployments in authentic scenes, we investigated the viability of physical object-triggered backdoor attacks in application settings.Our findings revealed 7 key insights. Importantly, the prevalent "digital" data poisoning method for injecting backdoors into models does not lead to effective attacks against detectors in the real world, although proven effective in classification tasks. We construct a new, cost-efficient attack method, dubbed Morphing, incorporating the unique nature of detection tasks; ours is remarkably successful in injecting physical object-triggered backdoors, even capable of poisoning triggers with clean label annotations or invisible triggers without diminishing the success of physical object triggered backdoors. We discovered that the defenses curated are ill-equipped to safeguard detectors against such attacks. To underscore the severity of the threat and foster further research, we, for the first time, release an extensive video test set of real-world backdoor attacks. Our study not only establishes the credibility and seriousness of this threat but also serves as a clarion call to the research community to advance backdoor defenses in the context of object detection. Our dataset—DriveByFlyBy—release, demo videos and code is at https://BackdoorDetectors.github.io.

Diffusion models excel at generating visually striking content from text but can inadvertently produce undesirable or harmful content when trained on unfiltered internet data. A practical solution is to selectively removing target concepts from the model, but this may impact the remaining concepts. Prior approaches have tried to balance this by introducing a loss term to preserve neutral content or a regularization term to minimize changes in the model parameters, yet resolving this trade-off remains challenging. In this work, we propose to identify and preserving concepts most affected by parameter changes, termed as *adversarial concepts*. This approach ensures stable erasure with minimal impact on the other concepts. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method using the Stable Diffusion model, showing that it outperforms state-of-the-art erasure methods in eliminating unwanted content while maintaining the integrity of other unrelated elements. Our code is available at \url{https://github.com/tuananhbui89/Erasing-Adversarial-Preservation}.

We present a new algorithm to train a robust malware detector. Malware is a prolific problem and malware detectors are a front-line defense. Modern detectors rely on machine learning algorithms. Now, the adversarial objective is to devise alterations to the malware code to decrease the chance of being detected whilst preserving the functionality and realism of the malware. Adversarial learning is effective in improving robustness but generating functional and realistic adversarial malware samples is non-trivial. Because: i) in contrast to tasks capable of using gradient-based feedback, adversarial learning in a domain without a differentiable mapping function from the problem space (malware code inputs) to the feature space is hard; and ii) it is difficult to ensure the adversarial malware is realistic and functional. This presents a challenge for developing scalable adversarial machine learning algorithms for large datasets at a production or commercial scale to realize robust malware detectors. We propose an alternative; perform adversarial learning in the feature space in contrast to the problem space. We prove the projection of perturbed, yet valid malware, in the problem space into feature space will always be a subset of adversarials generated in the feature space. Hence, by generating a robust network against feature-space adversarial examples, we inherently achieve robustness against problem-space adversarial examples. We formulate a Bayesian adversarial learning objective that captures the distribution of models for improved robustness. To explain the robustness of the Bayesian adversarial learning algorithm, we prove that our learning method bounds the difference between the adversarial risk and empirical risk and improves robustness. We show that Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) achieve state-of-the-art results; especially in the False Positive Rate (FPR) regime. Adversarially trained BNNs achieve state-of-the-art robustness. Notably, adversarially trained BNNs are robust against stronger attacks with larger attack budgets by a margin of up to 15% on a recent production-scale malware dataset of more than 20 million samples. Importantly, our efforts create a benchmark for future defenses in the malware domain.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have achieved tremendous success in many graph mining tasks benefitting from the message passing strategy that fuses the local structure and node features for better graph representation learning. Despite the success of GNNs, and similar to other types of deep neural networks, GNNs are found to be vulnerable to unnoticeable perturbations on both graph structure and node features. Many adversarial attacks have been proposed to disclose the fragility of GNNs under different perturbation strategies to create adversarial examples. However, vulnerability of GNNs to successful backdoor attacks was only shown recently.

Ensemble-based Adversarial Training is a principled approach to achieve robustness against adversarial attacks. An important technicality of this approach is to control the transferability of adversarial examples between ensemble members. We propose in this work a simple, but effective strategy to collaborate among committee models of an ensemble model. This is achieved via the secure and insecure sets defined for each model member on a given sample, hence help us to quantify and regularize the transferability. Consequently, our proposed framework provides the flexibility to reduce the adversarial transferability as well as promote the diversity of ensemble members, which are two crucial factors for better robustness in our ensemble approach. We conduct extensive and comprehensive experiments to demonstrate that our proposed method outperforms the state-of-the-art ensemble baselines, at the same time can detect a wide range of adversarial examples with a near perfect accuracy.

Nonlinear regression, although widely used in engineering, financial and security applications for automated decision making, is known to be vulnerable to training data poisoning. Targeted poisoning attacks may cause learning algorithms to fit decision functions with poor predictive performance. This paper presents a new analysis of local intrinsic dimensionality (LID) of nonlinear regression under such poisoning attacks within a Stackelberg game, leading to a practical defense. After adapting a gradient-based attack on linear regression that significantly impairs prediction capabilities to nonlinear settings, we consider a multi-step unsupervised black-box defense. The first step identifies samples that have the greatest influence on the learner's validation error; we then use the theory of local intrinsic dimensionality, which reveals the degree of being an outlier of data samples, to iteratively identify poisoned samples via a generative probabilistic model, and suppress their influence on the prediction function. Empirical validation demonstrates superior performance compared to a range of recent defenses.

Recent studies have demonstrated that reinforcement learning (RL) agents are susceptible to adversarial manipulation, similar to vulnerabilities previously demonstrated in the supervised learning setting. While most existing work studies the problem in the context of computer vision or console games, this paper focuses on reinforcement learning in autonomous cyber defence under partial observability. We demonstrate that under the black-box setting, where the attacker has no direct access to the target RL model, causative attacks-attacks that target the training process-can poison RL agents even if the attacker only has partial observability of the environment. In addition, we propose an inversion defence method that aims to apply the opposite perturbation to that which an attacker might use to generate their adversarial samples. Our experimental results illustrate that the countermeasure can effectively reduce the impact of the causative attack, while not significantly affecting the training process in non-attack scenarios.

Investigative profiling is an important activity in computer forensics that can narrow the search for one or more computer perpetrators. Data mining is a technique that has produced good results in providing insight into large volumes of data. This paper describes how the association rule data mining technique may be employed to generate profiles from log data and the methodology used for the interpretation of the resulting rule sets. The process relies on background knowledge in the form of concept hierarchies and beliefs, commonly available from, or attainable by, the computer forensic investigative team. Results obtained with the profiling system has identified irregularities in computer logs.