Abstract This paper studies which truth-values are most likely to be taken on finite models by arbitrary sentences of a many-valued predicate logic. The classical zero-one law (independently proved by Fagin and Glebskiĭ et al.) states that every sentence in a purely relational language is almost surely false or almost surely true, meaning that the probability that the formula is true in a randomly chosen finite structures of cardinal n is asymptotically $0$ or $1$ as n grows to infinity. We obtain generalizations of this result for any logic with values in a finite lattice-ordered algebra, and for some infinitely valued logics, including Łukasiewicz logic. The finitely valued case is reduced to the classical one through a uniform translation and Oberschelp’s generalization of the zero-one law. Moreover, it is shown that the complexity of determining the almost sure value of a given sentence is PSPACE-complete (generalizing Grandjean’s result for the classical case), and for some logics we describe completely the set of truth-values that can be taken by sentences almost surely.

Abstract Lindström’s theorem obviously fails as a characterization of first-order logic without identity ( $\mathcal {L}_{\omega \omega }^{-} $ ). In this note, we provide a fix: we show that $\mathcal {L}_{\omega \omega }^{-} $ is a maximal abstract logic satisfying a weak form of the isomorphism property (suitable for identity-free languages and studied in [11]), the Löwenheim–Skolem property, and compactness. Furthermore, we show that compactness can be replaced by being recursively enumerable for validity under certain conditions. In the proofs, we use a form of strong upwards Löwenheim–Skolem theorem not available in the framework with identity.

In this paper we study frame definability in finitely valued modal logics and establish two main results via suitable translations: (1) in finitely valued modal logics one cannot define more classes of frames than are already definable in classical modal logic (cf. [27, Thm. 8]), and (2) a large family of finitely valued modal logics define exactly the same classes of frames as classical modal logic (including modal logics based on finite Heyting and MV-algebras, or even BL-algebras). In this way one may observe, for example, that the celebrated Goldblatt–Thomason theorem applies immediately to these logics. In particular, we obtain the central result from [26] with a much simpler proof and answer one of the open questions left in that paper. Moreover, the proposed translations allow us to determine the computational complexity of a big class of finitely valued modal logics.

A correspondence is established between one-variable fragments of (first-order) intermediate logics defined over a fixed countable linear frame and Gödel modal logics defined over many-valued equivalence relations with values in a closed subset of the real unit interval. It is also shown that each of these logics can be interpreted in the one-variable fragment of the corresponding constant domain intermediate logic, which is equivalent to a Gödel modal logic defined over (crisp) equivalence relations. Although the latter modal logics in general lack the finite model property with respect to their frame semantics, an alternative semantics is defined that has this property and used to establish co-NP-completeness results for the one-variable fragments of the corresponding intermediate logics both with and without constant domains.

We consider the Gödel bi-modal logic determined by fuzzy Kripke models where both the propositions and the accessibility relation are infinitely valued over the standard Gödel algebra [0,1], and prove strong completeness of the Fischer Servi intuitionistic modal logic IK plus the prelinearity axiom with respect to this semantics. We axiomatize also the bi-modal analogues of classical T, S4 and S5, obtained by restricting to models over frames satisfying the [0,1]-valued versions of the structural properties which characterize these logics. As an application of the completeness theorems we obtain a representation theorem for bi-modal Gödel algebras.

Abstract. It is shown that axiomatic extensions of intuitionistic propositional calculus defining univocally new connectives, including those proposed by Gabbay, are strongly complete with respect to valuations in Heyting algebras with additional operations. In all cases, the double negation of such a connective is equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. Thus, under the excluded third law it collapses to a classical formula, showing that this condition in Gabbay's definition is redundant. Moreover, such connectives can not be interpreted in all Heyting algebras, unless they are already equivalent to a formula of intuitionistic calculus. These facts relativize to connectives over intermediate logics. In particular, the intermediate logic with values in the chain of lengthnmay be “completed” conservatively by adding a single unary connective, so that the expandedsystemdoes not allow further axiomatic extensions by new connectives.

Abstract It is shown that Friedman's problem, whether there exists a proper extension of first order logic satisfying the compactness and interpolation theorems, has extremely simple positive solutions if one considers extensions by generalized (finitary) propositional connectives. This does not solve, however, the problem of whether such extensions exist which are also closed under relativization of formulas.