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Yi Liu 0042

dblp:97/4626-42 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
0000-0002-2683-1262ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Authentication and access control · 85% Systems and software security · 15%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs
CAPTCHA
1.132020
An End-to-End Attack on Text CAPTCHAs · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020
Research on Deep Learning Techniques in Breaking Text-Based Captchas and Designing Image-Based Captcha · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018
Research on the Security of Microsoft's Two-Layer Captcha · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs › CAPTCHA
text-based captcha breaking
0.822020
An End-to-End Attack on Text CAPTCHAs · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020
Research on Deep Learning Techniques in Breaking Text-Based Captchas and Designing Image-Based Captcha · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2018
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs › CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA security
0.412020
An End-to-End Attack on Text CAPTCHAs · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.412020
An End-to-End Attack on Text CAPTCHAs · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2020
Authentication and access control › human interactive proofs › CAPTCHA
CAPTCHA breaking
0.312017
Research on the Security of Microsoft's Two-Layer Captcha · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2017

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

convolutional neural network · 0.4attention-based recurrent neural network · 0.4semantic segmentation · 0.3deep learning · 0.3segmentation-based attack · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2020 An End-to-End Attack on Text CAPTCHAs
abstract
Text-based CAPTCHAs are the most widely used CAPTCHA scheme. Most text-based CAPTCHAs have been cracked. However, previous works have mostly relied on a series of preprocessing steps to attack text CAPTCHAs, which was complicated and inefficient. In this paper, we introduce a simple, generic, and effective end-to-end attack on text CAPTCHAs without any preprocessing. Through a convolutional neural network and an attention-based recurrent neural network, our attack broke a wide range of real-world text CAPTCHAs that are deployed by the top 50 most popular websites ranked by Alexa.com. In addition, this paper comprehensively analyzed the security of most resistance mechanisms of text-based CAPTCHAs through experiments. Experimental results prove that the anti-segmentation principle can be completely broken under deep learning attacks without any segmentation or preprocessing steps in contrast to commonly held beliefs.
Yang Zi, Haichang Gao, Zhouhang Cheng, Yi Liu 0042
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.4
2018 Research on Deep Learning Techniques in Breaking Text-Based Captchas and Designing Image-Based Captcha
abstract
The ability of hackers to infiltrate computer systems using computer attack programs and bots led to the development of Captchas or Completely Automated Public Turing Tests to Tell Computers and Humans Apart. The text Captcha is the most popular Captcha scheme given its ease of construction and user friendliness. However, the next generation of hackers and programmers has decreased the expected security of these mechanisms, leaving websites open to attack. Text Captchas are still widely used, because it is believed that the attack speeds are slow, typically two to five seconds per image, and this is not seen as a critical threat. In this paper, we introduce a simple, generic, and fast attack on text Captchas that effectively challenges that supposition. With deep learning techniques, our attack demonstrates a high success rate in breaking the Roman-character-based text Captchas deployed by the top 50 most popular international websites and three Chinese Captchas that use a larger character set. These targeted schemes cover almost all existing resistance mechanisms, demonstrating that our attack techniques are also applicable to other existing Captchas. Does this work then spell the beginning of the end for text-based Captcha? We believe so. A novel image-based Captcha named Style Area Captcha (SACaptcha) is proposed in this paper, which is based on semantic information understanding, pixel-level segmentation, and deep learning techniques. Having demonstrated that text Captchas are no longer secure, we hope that our proposal shows promise in the development of image-based Captchas using deep learning techniques.
Mengyun Tang, Haichang Gao, Yi Liu 0042, Ping Wang 0027
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.4
2017 Research on the Security of Microsoft's Two-Layer Captcha
abstract
Captcha is a security mechanism designed to differentiate between computers and humans, and is used to defend against malicious bot programs. Text-based Captchas are the most widely deployed differentiation mechanism, and almost all text-based Captchas are single layered. Numerous successful attacks on the single-layer text-based Captchas deployed by Google, Yahoo!, and Amazon have been reported. In 2015, Microsoft deployed a new two-layer Captcha scheme. This appears to be the first application of two-layer Captchas. It is, therefore, natural to ask a fundamental question: is the two-layer Captcha as secure as its designers expected? Intrigued by this question, we have for the first time systematically analyzed the security of the two-layer Captcha in this paper. We propose a simple but an effective method to attack the two-layer Captcha deployed by Microsoft, and achieve a success rate of 44.6% with an average speed of 9.05 s on a standard desktop computer (with a 3.3-GHz Intel Core i3 CPU and 2-GB RAM), thus demonstrating clear security issues. We also discuss the originality and applicability of our attack, and offer guidelines for designing Captchas with better security and usability.
Haichang Gao, Mengyun Tang, Yi Liu 0042
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.3