EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Sudeep Kanav
dblp:98/10411
· DBLP profile ↗
9ranked-venue papers
1as first author
6since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0001-6078-4175ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 7 · 1 first-author · 4 since 2021Theory of computation · 4 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Explaining Control Policies through Predicate Decision DiagramsabstractSafety-critical controllers of complex systems are hard to construct manually. Automated approaches such as controller synthesis or learning provide a tempting alternative but usually lack explainability. To this end, learning decision trees (DTs) has been prevalently used towards an interpretable model of the generated controllers. However, DTs do not exploit shared decision making, a key concept exploited in binary decision diagrams (BDDs) to reduce their size and thus improve explainability. In this work, we introduce predicate decision diagrams (PDDs) that extend BDDs with predicates and thus unite the advantages of DTs and BDDs for controller representation. We establish a synthesis pipeline for efficient construction of PDDs from DTs representing controllers, exploiting reduction techniques for BDDs also for PDDs. Debraj Chakraborty 0002, Clemens Dubslaff, Sudeep Kanav, Jan Kretínský, Christoph Weinhuber |
HSCC | 3 |
| 2025 | 1-2-3-Go! Policy Synthesis for Parameterized Markov Decision Processes via Decision-Tree Learning and Generalization
Muqsit Azeem, Debraj Chakraborty 0002, Sudeep Kanav, Jan Kretínský, MohammadSadegh Mohagheghi, Stefanie Mohr, Maximilian Weininger |
VMCAI (2) | 3 |
| 2025 | Construction of verifier combinations from off-the-shelf componentsabstractAbstract Software verifiers have different strengths and weaknesses, depending on the characteristics of the verification task. It is well-known that combinations of verifiers via portfolio- and selection-based approaches can help to combine their strengths. In this paper, we investigate (a) how to easily compose such combinations from existing, ‘off-the-shelf’ verifiers without changing them and (b) how much performance improvement each combination can yield, regarding the effectiveness (number of solved verification tasks) and efficiency (consumed resources). First, we contribute a method to systematically and conveniently construct verifier combinations from existing tools using CoVeriTeam. We consider sequential portfolios, parallel portfolios, and algorithm selections. Second, we perform a large experiment to show that combinations can improve the verification results without additional computational resources. Our benchmark set is the category ReachSafety as used in the 11th Competition on Software Verification (SV-COMP 2022). This category contains 5 400 verification tasks, with diverse characteristics. The key novelty of this work in comparison to the conference version of the article is to introduce a validation step into the verifier combinations. By validating the output of the verifier, we can mitigate the adverse effect of unsound tools on the performance of portfolios, especially parallel portfolios, as observed in our previous experiments. We confirm that combinations employing a validation process are significantly more robust against the inclusion of unsound verifiers. Finally, all combinations are constructed from off-the-shelf verifiers, that is, we use the verification tools as published. The results of our work suggest that users of combinations of verification tools can achieve a significant improvement at a negligible cost, and more robustness by using combinations with validators. Dirk Beyer 0001, Sudeep Kanav, Tobias Kleinert, Cedric Richter |
Formal Methods Syst. Des. | 2 |
| 2024 | Monitizer: Automating Design and Evaluation of Neural Network MonitorsabstractAbstract The behavior of neural networks (NNs) on previously unseen types of data (out-of-distribution or OOD) is typically unpredictable. This can be dangerous if the network’s output is used for decision making in a safety-critical system. Hence, detecting that an input is OOD is crucial for the safe application of the NN. Verification approaches do not scale to practical NNs, making runtime monitoring more appealing for practical use. While various monitors have been suggested recently, their optimization for a given problem, as well as comparison with each other and reproduction of results, remain challenging. We present a tool for users and developers of NN monitors. It allows for (i) application of various types of monitors from the literature to a given input NN, (ii) optimization of the monitor’s hyperparameters, and (iii) experimental evaluation and comparison to other approaches. Besides, it facilitates the development of new monitoring approaches. We demonstrate the tool’s usability on several use cases of different types of users as well as on a case study comparing different approaches from recent literature. Muqsit Azeem, Marta Grobelna, Sudeep Kanav, Jan Kretínský, Stefanie Mohr, Sabine Rieder |
CAV (2) | 3 |
| 2022 | Construction of Verifier Combinations Based on Off-the-Shelf VerifiersabstractAbstract Software verifiers have different strengths and weaknesses, depending on properties of the verification task. It is well-known that combinations of verifiers via portfolio and selection approaches can help to combine the strengths. In this paper, we investigate (a) how to easily compose such combinations fromexisting, ‘off-the-shelf’ verification tools without changing them and (b) how much performance improvement easy combinations can yield, regarding the effectiveness (number of solved problems) and efficiency (consumed resources). First, we contribute a method to systematically and conveniently construct verifier combinations from existing tools, using the composition frameworkCoVeriTeam. We consider sequential portfolios, parallel portfolios, and algorithm selections. Second, we perform a large experiment on 8 883 verification tasks to show that combinations can improve the verification resultswithoutadditional computational resources. All combinations are constructed from off-the-shelf verifiers, that is, we use them as published. The result of our work suggests that users of verification tools can achieve a significant improvement at a negligible cost (only configure our composition scripts). Dirk Beyer 0001, Sudeep Kanav, Cedric Richter |
FASE | 2 |
| 2022 | CoVeriTeam: On-Demand Composition of Cooperative Verification SystemsabstractAbstract There is no silver bullet for software verification: Different techniques have different strengths. Thus, it is imperative to combine the strengths of verification tools via combinations and cooperation. CoVeriTeam is a language and tool for on-demand composition of cooperative approaches. It provides a systematic and modular way to combine existing tools (without changing them) in order to leverage their full potential. The idea of cooperative verification is that different tools help each other to achieve the goal of correctly solving verification tasks. The language is based on verification artifacts (programs, specifications, witnesses) as basic objects and verification actors (verifiers, validators, testers) as basic operations. We define composition operators that make it possible to easily describe new compositions. Verification artifacts are the interface between the different verification actors. CoVeriTeam consists of a language for composition of verification actors, and its interpreter. As a result of viewing tools as components, we can now create powerful verification engines that are beyond the possibilities of single tools, avoiding to develop certain components repeatedly. We illustrate the abilities of CoVeriTeam on a few case studies. We expect that CoVeriTeam will help verification researchers and practitioners to easily experiment with new tools, and assist them in rapid prototyping of tool combinations. Dirk Beyer 0001, Sudeep Kanav |
TACAS (1) | 2 |
| 2020 | An Interface Theory for Program VerificationabstractAbstract Program verification is the problem, for a given program $$P$$ and a specification $$\phi $$ , of constructing a proof of correctness for the statement “program $$P$$ satisfies specification $$\phi $$ ” ( $$P \models \phi $$ ) or a proof of violation ("Equation missing"). Usually, a correctness proof is based on inductive invariants, and a violation proof on a violating program trace. Verification engineers typically expect that a verification tool exports these proof artifacts. We propose to view the task of program verification as constructing a behavioral interface (represented e.g. by an automaton). We start with the interface $$I_{P}$$ of the program itself, which represents all traces of program executions. To prove correctness, we try to construct a more abstract interface $$I_{C}$$ of the program (overapproximation) that satisfies the specification. This interface, if found, represents more traces than $$I_{P}$$ that are allcorrect(satisfying the specification). Ultimately, we want a compact representation of the program behavior as acorrectness interface $$I_{C}$$ in terms ofinductive invariants. We can then extract a correctness witness, in standard exchange format, out of such a correctness interface. Symmetrically, to prove violation, we try to construct a more concrete interface $$I_{V}$$ of the program (underapproximation) that violates the specification. This interface, if found, represents fewer traces than $$I_{P}$$ that are allfeasible(can be executed). Ultimately, we want a compact representation of the program behavior as aviolation interface $$I_{V}$$ in terms of aviolating program trace. We can then extract a violation witness, in standard exchange format, out of such a violation interface. This viewpoint exposes the duality of these two tasks — proving correctness and violation. It enables the decomposition of the verification process, and its tools, into (at least!) three components: interface synthesizers, refinement checkers, and specification checkers. We hope the reader finds this viewpoint useful, although the underlying ideas are not novel. We see it as a framework towards modular program verification. Dirk Beyer 0001, Sudeep Kanav |
ISoLA (1) | 2 |
| 2017 | Tool Support for Live Formal VerificationabstractDespite an increasing interest from industry (e.g., DO333 standard [1]), formal verification is still not widely used in production for safety critical systems. This has been recognized for a while and various causes have been identified, one of them being the lack for scalable and cost effective tools. Many such tools exist for formal verification, but few of them are userfriendly: using formal verification generally still requires such an effort that the time spent on the tool prevents the integration of the method in an industrial setting. This paper presents a tool prototype aiming at supporting non-experts in using formal verification. The tooling approach is meant to be cost effective and change-supportive: user-friendliness is designed not only for the non-expert, but also to require minimum effort so that formal verification is triggered even for the non-enthusiast who is not willing to push a button. To do so, we trigger, in a background task, pre-defined formal verification checks at (almost) every change of the model. We only display error messages in case of problem: the user is not disturbed if no problem is detected. To prevent checks to be triggered all the time, we decide to consider only local analyses (i.e., only checks which do not require knowledge of elements in a remote position in the model). This restricts the sort of formal verification that we support, but this is a conscious choice: our motto is ”Let us first make basic techniques very user-friendly; more powerful ones will be considered only when at least the basic techniques have proven to be accepted”. Vincent Aravantinos, Sudeep Kanav |
MoDELS | 2 |
| 2014 | A Conference Management System with Verified Document Confidentiality
Sudeep Kanav, Peter Lammich, Andrei Popescu 0001 |
CAV | 1 |