Multi-page visual documents such as manuals, brochures, presentations, and posters convey key information through layout, colors, icons, and cross-slide references.While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) offer opportunities in document understanding, current systems struggle with complex, multi-page visual documents, particularly in fine-grained reasoning over elements and pages.We introduce SlideAgent, a versatile agentic framework for understanding multi-modal, multipage, and multi-layout documents, especially slide decks.SlideAgent employs specialized agents and decomposes reasoning into three specialized levels-global, page, and element-to construct a structured, query-agnostic representation that captures both overarching themes and detailed visual or textual cues.During inference, SlideAgent selectively activates specialized agents for multi-level reasoning and integrates their outputs into coherent, contextaware answers.Extensive experiments show that SlideAgent significantly improves accuracy over both proprietary (+7.9%) and opensource models (+9.8%).

Recent multimodal LLMs have shown promise in chart-based visual question answering, but their performance declines sharply on unannotated charts-those requiring precise visual interpretation rather than relying on textual shortcuts. To address this, we introduce ChartAgent, a novel agentic framework that explicitly performs visual reasoning directly within the chart's spatial domain. Unlike textual chain-of-thought reasoning, ChartAgent iteratively decomposes queries into visual subtasks and actively manipulates and interacts with chart images through specialized actions such as drawing annotations, cropping regions (e.g., segmenting pie slices, isolating bars), and localizing axes, using a library of chart-specific vision tools to fulfill each subtask. This iterative reasoning process closely mirrors human cognitive strategies for chart comprehension. ChartAgent achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on the ChartBench and ChartX benchmarks, surpassing prior methods by up to 16.07% absolute gain overall and 17.31% on unannotated, numerically intensive queries. Furthermore, our analyses show that ChartAgent is (a) effective across diverse chart types, (b) achieves the highest scores across varying visual and reasoning complexity levels, and (c) serves as a plug-and-play framework that boosts performance across diverse underlying LLMs. Our work is among the first to demonstrate visually grounded reasoning for chart understanding using tool-augmented multimodal agents.

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that fully-substitutable preferences guarantee the existence of competitive equilibria which can be centrally computed. Our motivation comes from the fact that prices in markets such as over-the-counter markets and used car markets arise from decentralized negotiation among agents, which has left open an important question as to whether equilibrium prices can emerge from agent-to-agent bilateral negotiations. We design a best response dynamic intended to capture such negotiations between market participants. We assume fully substitutable preferences for market participants. In this setting, we provide proofs of convergence for sparse markets (covering many real world markets of interest), and experimental results for more general cases, demonstrating that prices indeed reach equilibrium, quickly, via bilateral negotiations. Our best response dynamic, and its convergence behavior, forms an important first step in understanding how decentralized markets reach, and retain, equilibrium.

Equivariant neural networks have shown great success in reinforcement learning, improving sample efficiency and generalization when there is symmetry in the task. However, in many problems, only approximate symmetry is present, which makes imposing exact symmetry inappropriate. Recently, approximately equivariant networks have been proposed for supervised classification and modeling physical systems. In this work, we develop approximately equivariant algorithms in reinforcement learning (RL). We define approximately equivariant MDPs and theoretically characterize the effect of approximate equivariance on the optimal Q function. We propose novel RL architectures using relaxed group and steerable convolutions and experiment on several continuous control domains and stock trading with real financial data. Our results demonstrate that the approximately equivariant network performs on par with exactly equivariant networks when exact symmetries are present, and outperforms them when the domains exhibit approximate symmetry. As an added byproduct of these techniques, we observe increased robustness to noise at test time. Our code is available at \url{https://github.com/jypark0/approx_equiv_rl.}

We consider discrete-time stationary mean field games (MFG) with unknown dynamics and design algorithms for finding the equilibrium with finite-time complexity guarantees. Prior solutions to the problem assume either the contraction of a mean field optimality-consistency operator or strict weak monotonicity, which may be overly restrictive. In this work, we introduce a new class of solvable MFGs, named the "fully herding class", which expands the known solvable class of MFGs and for the first time includes problems with multiple equilibria. We propose a direct policy optimization method, Accelerated Single-loop Actor Critic Algorithm for Mean Field Games (ASAC-MFG), that provably finds a global equilibrium for MFGs within this class, under suitable access to a single trajectory of Markovian samples. Different from the prior methods, ASAC-MFG is single-loop and single-sample-path. We establish the finite-time and finite-sample convergence of ASAC-MFG to a mean field equilibrium via new techniques that we develop for multi-time-scale stochastic approximation. We support the theoretical results with illustrative numerical simulations. When the mean field does not affect the transition and reward, a MFG reduces to a Markov decision process (MDP) and ASAC-MFG becomes an actor-critic algorithm for finding the optimal policy in average-reward MDPs, with a sample complexity matching the state-of-the-art. Previous works derive the complexity assuming a contraction on the Bellman operator, which is invalid for average-reward MDPs. We match the rate while removing the untenable assumption through an improved Lyapunov function.

The standard contextual bandit framework assumes fully observable and actionable contexts. In this work, we consider a new bandit setting with partially observable and correlated contexts, with linear payoffs, motivated by the applications in finance where decision making is based on market information that typically displays temporal correlation and is not fully observed. We make the following contributions marrying ideas from statistical signal processing with bandits: (i) We propose an algorithmic pipeline named EMKF-Bandit, which integrates system identification, filtering, and classic contextual bandit algorithms into an iterative method alternating between latent parameter estimation and decision making. (ii) We analyze EMKF-Bandit when we select Thompson sampling as the bandit algorithm and show that it incurs a sub-linear regret under conditions on filtering. (iii) We conduct numerical simulations that demonstrate the benefits and practical applicability of the proposed pipeline.

Alignment of Large Language models (LLMs) is crucial for safe and trustworthy deployment in applications. Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as an effective technique to align LLMs to human preferences, and broader utilities, but it requires updating billions of model parameters which is computationally expensive. Controlled Decoding, by contrast, provides a mechanism for aligning a model at inference time without retraining. However, single-agent decoding approaches often struggle to adapt to diverse tasks due to the complexity and variability inherent in these tasks. To strengthen the test-time performance w.r.t the target task, we propose a mixture of agents-based decoding strategies leveraging the existing off-the-shelf aligned LLM policies. Treating each prior policy as an agent in the spirit of mixture of agent collaboration, we develop a decoding method that allows for inference-time alignment through a token-level selection strategy among multiple agents. For each token, the most suitable LLM is dynamically chosen from a pool of models based on a long-term utility metric. This policy-switching mechanism ensures optimal model selection at each step, enabling efficient collaboration and alignment among LLMs during decoding. Theoretical analysis of our proposed algorithm establishes optimal performance with respect to the target task represented via a target reward, for the given off-the-shelf models. We conduct comprehensive empirical evaluations with open-source aligned models on diverse tasks and preferences, which demonstrates the merits of this approach over single-agent decoding baselines. Notably, COLLAB surpasses the current SoTA decoding strategy, achieving an improvement of {up to 1.56x} in average reward and $71.89\%$ in GPT-4 based win-tie rate.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit impressive capabilities but require careful alignment with human preferences. Traditional training-time methods finetune LLMs using human preference datasets but incur significant training costs and require repeated training to handle diverse user preferences. Test-time alignment methods address this by using reward models (RMs) to guide frozen LLMs without retraining. However, existing test-time approaches rely on trajectory-level RMs which are designed to evaluate complete responses, making them unsuitable for autoregressive text generation that requires computing next-token rewards from partial responses. To address this, we introduce GenARM, a test-time alignment approach that leverages the Autoregressive Reward Model—a novel reward parametrization designed to predict next-token rewards for efficient and effective autoregressive generation. Theoretically, we demonstrate that this parametrization can provably guide frozen LLMs toward any distribution achievable by traditional RMs within the KL-regularized reinforcement learning framework. Experimental results show that GenARM significantly outperforms prior test-time alignment baselines and matches the performance of training-time methods. Additionally, GenARM enables efficient weak-to-strong guidance, aligning larger LLMs with smaller RMs without the high costs of training larger models. Furthermore, GenARM supports multi-objective alignment, allowing real-time trade-offs between preference dimensions and catering to diverse user preferences without retraining. Our project page is available at: https://genarm.github.io.

Large language models (LLMs) are empowering decision-making in several applications, including tool or API usage and answering multiple-choice questions (MCQs). However, incorrect outputs pose significant risks in high-stakes domains like healthcare and finance. To quantify LLM uncertainty and thereby mitigate these risks, recent works employ conformal prediction (CP), a model- and distribution-agnostic framework that uses LLM outputs to generate a prediction set containing the true answer with high probability. Leveraging CP, we propose conformal revision of questions (CROQ), which revises the question by narrowing down the available choices to those in the prediction set and asking the LLM the revised question. We expect LLMs to be more accurate on revised questions with fewer choices. Furthermore, we expect CROQ to be effective when the prediction sets from CP are small. Commonly used logit scores often lead to large sets, diminishing CROQ’s effectiveness. To overcome this, we propose CP-OPT, an optimization framework to learn scores that minimize set sizes while maintaining coverage. Our extensive experiments on MMLU, ToolAlpaca, and TruthfulQA datasets with multiple LLMs show that CROQ improves accuracy over the standard inference, with more pronounced gains when paired with CP-OPT.

We study policy optimization in Stackelberg mean field games (MFGs), a hierarchical framework for modeling the strategic interaction between a single leader and an infinitely large population of homogeneous followers. The objective can be formulated as a structured bi-level optimization problem, in which the leader needs to learn a policy maximizing its reward, anticipating the response of the followers. Existing methods for solving these (and related) problems often rely on restrictive independence assumptions between the leader’s and followers’ objectives, use samples inefficiently due to nested-loop algorithm structure, and lack finite-time convergence guarantees. To address these limitations, we propose AC-SMFG, a single-loop actor-critic algorithm that operates on continuously generated Markovian samples. The algorithm alternates between (semi-)gradient updates for the leader, a representative follower, and the mean field, and is simple to implement in practice. We establish the finite-time and finite-sample convergence of the algorithm to a stationary point of the Stackelberg objective. To our knowledge, this is the first Stackelberg MFG algorithm with non-asymptotic convergence guarantees. Our key assumption is a "gradient alignment" condition, which requires that the full policy gradient of the leader can be approximated by a partial component of it, relaxing the existing leader-follower independence assumption. Simulation results in a range of well-established economics environments demonstrate that AC-SMFG outperforms existing multi-agent and MFG learning baselines in policy quality and convergence speed.

In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game’s payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these problems as generative-adversarial (i.e., min-max) optimization problems, which we develop polynomial-time algorithms to solve, the former of which relies on an exact first- order oracle, and the latter, a stochastic one. We extend our approach to solve inverse multiagent simulacral learning in polynomial time and number of samples. In these problems, we seek a simulacrum, meaning parameters and an associated equilibrium that replicate the given observations in expectation. We find that our approach outperforms the widely-used ARIMA method in predicting prices in Spanish electricity markets based on time-series data.

Policy optimization from batch data, i.e., offline reinforcement learning (RL) is important when collecting data from a current policy is not possible. This setting incurs distribution mismatch between batch training data and trajectories from the current policy. Pessimistic offsets estimate mismatch using concentration bounds, which possess strong theoretical guarantees and simplicity of implementation. Mismatch may be conservative in sparse data regions and less so otherwise, which can result in under-performing their no-penalty variants in practice. We derive a new pessimistic penalty as the distance between the data and the true distribution using an evaluable one-sample test known as Stein Discrepancy that requires minimal smoothness conditions, and noticeably, allows a mixture family representation of distribution over next states. This entity forms a quantifier of information in offline data, which justifies calling this approach *information-directed pessimism* (IDP) for offline RL. We further establish that this new penalty based on discrete Stein discrepancy yields practical gains in performance while generalizing the regret of prior art to multimodal distributions.

Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this work and the recent literature on learning to optimize for single functions, we introduce a new framework for learning last-iterate convergence to Nash Equilibria in games, where the update rule’s coefficients (learning rates) along a trajectory are learnt by a reinforcement learning policy that is conditioned on the nature of the game: the game signature. We construct the latter using a new decomposition of two-player games into eight components corresponding to commutative projection operators, generalizing and unifying recent game concepts studied in the literature. We compare the performance of various update rules when their coefficients are learnt, and show that the RL policy is able to exploit the game signature across a wide range of game types. In doing so, we introduce CMWU, a new algorithm that extends consensus optimization to the constrained case, has local convergence guarantees for zero-sum bimatrix games, and show that it enjoys competitive performance on both zero-sum games with constant coefficients and across a spectrum of games when its coefficients are learnt.

Policy gradient methods can solve complex tasks but often fail when the dimensionality of the action-space or objective multiplicity grow very large. This occurs, in part, because the variance on score-based gradient estimators scales quadratically. In this paper, we address this problem through a factor baseline which exploits independence structure encoded in a novel action-target influence network. Factored policy gradients (FPGs), which follow, provide a common framework for analysing key state-of-the-art algorithms, are shown to generalise traditional policy gradients, and yield a principled way of incorporating prior knowledge of a problem domain's generative processes. We provide an analysis of the proposed estimator and identify the conditions under which variance is reduced. The algorithmic aspects of FPGs are discussed, including optimal policy factorisation, as characterised by minimum biclique coverings, and the implications for the bias variance trade-off of incorrectly specifying the network. Finally, we demonstrate the performance advantages of our algorithm on large-scale bandit and traffic intersection problems, providing a novel contribution to the latter in the form of a spatial approximation.

Training multi-agent systems (MAS) to achieve realistic equilibria gives us a useful tool to understand and model real-world systems. We consider a general sum partially observable Markov game where agents of different types share a single policy network, conditioned on agent-specific information. This paper aims at i) formally understanding equilibria reached by such agents, and ii) matching emergent phenomena of such equilibria to real-world targets. Parameter sharing with decentralized execution has been introduced as an efficient way to train multiple agents using a single policy network. However, the nature of resulting equilibria reached by such agents has not been yet studied: we introduce the novel concept of Shared equilibrium as a symmetric pure Nash equilibrium of a certain Functional Form Game (FFG) and prove convergence to the latter for a certain class of games using self-play. In addition, it is important that such equilibria satisfy certain constraints so that MAS are calibrated to real world data for practical use: we solve this problem by introducing a novel dual-Reinforcement Learning based approach that fits emergent behaviors of agents in a Shared equilibrium to externally-specified targets, and apply our methods to a n-player market example. We do so by calibrating parameters governing distributions of agent types rather than individual agents, which allows both behavior differentiation among agents and coherent scaling of the shared policy network to multiple agents.

We present a novel approach to the problem of representation and recognition of human actions, that uses an optimal control based model to connect the high-level goals of a human subject to the low-level movement trajectories captured by a computer vision system. These models quantify the high-level goals as a performance criterion or cost function which the human sensorimotor system optimizes by picking the control strategy that achieves the best possible performance. We show that the human body can be modeled as a hybrid linear system that can operate in one of several possible modes, where each mode corresponds to a particular high-level goal or cost function. The problem of action recognition, then is to infer the current mode of the system from observations of the movement trajectory. We demonstrate our approach on 3D visual data of human arm motion.