Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
James H. Hamlyn-Harris
dblp:98/7191
· DBLP profile ↗
6ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 2Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Program analysis · 33% Software testing · 25% Services computing and microservices · 25% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Services computing and microservices › service composition
composite web services |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Dynamic Test Reconfigurationfor Composite Web Services · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2015 |
Software testing › test execution
runtime testing |
0.2 | 1 | 2015 | Dynamic Test Reconfigurationfor Composite Web Services · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2015 |
Program analysis › static analysis
pointer analysis |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Supporting operating system kernel data disambiguation using points-to analysis · ASE 2012 |
Program analysis
static analysis |
0.1 | 1 | 2012 | Supporting operating system kernel data disambiguation using points-to analysis · ASE 2012 |
Systems and software security › operating system security
kernel integrity |
0.0 | 1 | 2012 | Supporting operating system kernel data disambiguation using points-to analysis · ASE 2012 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
points-to analysis · 0.3random testing · 0.2change identification · 0.2
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2015 | Dynamic Test Reconfigurationfor Composite Web ServicesabstractThis paper introduces a testing strategy that is suitable for testing service-based applications. We describe an architecture that responds to changes of service operation, operation arguments and service composition changes. Our proof-of-concept test system performs runtime testing on our model atomic and composite web services using a random testing technique. A novel change identification method was developed to capture changes at the service interface. The test system is able to identify changes that occur in service operations and operational arguments in a service description of a test candidate. Our approach uses a new method to detect changes in a service inventory. Automated reconfiguration is used to support the continuous operation of the testing systems during a test candidate change. Mark B. Cooray, James H. Hamlyn-Harris, Robert G. Merkel |
IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. | 2 |
| 2012 | Supporting Virtualization-Aware Security Solutions Using a Systematic Approach to Overcome the Semantic GapabstractA prerequisite to implementing virtualization-aware security solutions is to solve the "semantic gap" problem. Current approaches require a deep knowledge of the kernel data to manually solve the semantic gap. However, kernel data is very complex; an Operating System (OS) kernel contains thousands of data structures that have direct and indirect (pointer) relations between each other with no explicit integrity constraints. This complexity makes it impractical to use manual methods. In this paper, we present a new solution to systematically and efficiently solve the semantic gap for any OS, without any prior knowledge of the OS. We present: (i) KDD, a tool that systematically builds a precise kernel data definition for any C-based OS such as Windows and Linux. KDD generates this definition by performing points-to analysis on the kernel's source code to disambiguate the pointer relations. (ii) SVA, a security appliance that solves the semantic gap based on the generated definition, to systematically and externally map the virtual machines' physical memory and extract the runtime dynamic objects. We have implemented prototypes for KDD and SVA, and have performed different experiments to prove their effectiveness. Amani S. Ibrahim, James H. Hamlyn-Harris, John C. Grundy, Mohamed Almorsy |
IEEE CLOUD | 2 |
| 2012 | Supporting operating system kernel data disambiguation using points-to analysisabstractGeneric pointers scattered around operating system (OS) kernels make the kernel data layout ambiguous. This limits current kernel integrity checking research to covering a small fraction of kernel data. Hence, there is a great need to obtain an accurate kernel data definition that resolves generic pointer ambiguities, in order to formulate a set of constraints between structures to support precise integrity checking. In this paper, we present KDD, a new tool for systematically generating a sound kernel data definition for any C-based OS e.g. Windows and Linux, without any prior knowledge of the kernel data layout. KDD performs static points-to analysis on the kernel’s source code to infer the appropriate candidate types for generic pointers. We implemented a prototype of KDD and evaluated it to prove its scalability and effectiveness. Amani S. Ibrahim, John C. Grundy, James H. Hamlyn-Harris, Mohamed Almorsy |
ASE | 3 |
| 2012 | Operating System Kernel Data Disambiguation to Support Security Analysis
Amani S. Ibrahim, John C. Grundy, James H. Hamlyn-Harris, Mohamed Almorsy |
NSS | 3 |
| 2012 | Identifying OS Kernel Objects for Run-Time Security Analysis
Amani S. Ibrahim, James H. Hamlyn-Harris, John C. Grundy, Mohamed Almorsy |
NSS | 2 |
| 2011 | CloudSec: A security monitoring appliance for Virtual Machines in the IaaS cloud modelabstractThe Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud computing model has become a compelling computing solution with a proven ability to reduce costs and improve resource efficiency. Virtualization has a key role in supporting the IaaS model. However, virtualization also makes it a target for potent rootkits because of the loss of control problem over the hosted Virtual Machines (VMs). This makes traditional in-guest security solutions, relying on operating system kernel trustworthiness, no longer an effective solution to secure the virtual infrastructure of the IaaS model. In this paper, we explore briefly the security problem of the IaaS cloud computing model, and present CloudSec, a new virtualization-aware monitoring appliance that provides active, transparent and real-time security monitoring for hosted VMs in the IaaS model. CloudSec utilizes virtual machine introspection techniques to provide fine-grained inspection of VM's physical memory without installing any monitoring code inside the VM. It actively reconstructs and monitors the dynamically changing kernel data structures instances, as a prior step to enable providing protection for kernel data structures. We have implemented a proof-of-concept prototype using VMsafe libraries on a VMware ESX platform. We have evaluated the system monitoring accuracy and the performance overhead of CloudSec. Amani S. Ibrahim, James H. Hamlyn-Harris, John C. Grundy, Mohamed Almorsy |
NSS | 2 |