One important aspect of privacy is the ability to securely delete sensitive data from electronic storage in such a way that it cannot be recovered; we call this action secure deletion . Short of physically destroying the entire storage medium, existing software secure-deletion solutions tend to be piecemeal at best -- they may only work for one type of storage or file system, may force the user to delete all files instead of selected ones, may require the added complexities of encryption and key storage, may require extensive changes and additions to the computer's operating system or storage firmware, and may not handle system crashes gracefully. We present TrueErase, a holistic secure-deletion framework for individual systems that contain sensitive data. Through design, implementation, verification, and evaluation on both a hard drive and NAND flash, TrueErase shows that it is possible to construct a per-file, secure-deletion framework that can accommodate different storage media and legacy file systems, require limited changes to legacy systems, and handle common crash scenarios. TrueErase can serve as a building block by cryptographic systems that securely delete information by erasing encryption keys. The overhead is dependent on spatial locality, number of sensitive files, and workload (computational- or I/O-bound).

The ability to securely delete sensitive data from electronic storage is becoming important. However, current per-file deletion solutions tend to be limited to a segment of the operating system's storage data path or specific to particular file systems or storage media.