Algebraic differential fault attack (ADFA) is an attack in which an attacker combines a differential fault attack and an algebraic technique to break a targeted cipher. In this paper, we present three attacks using three different algebraic techniques combined with a differential fault attack in the bit-flip fault model to break the SIMON block cipher. First, we introduce a new analytic method which is based on a differential trail between the correct and faulty ciphertexts. This method is able to recover the entire master key of any member of the SIMON family by injecting faults into a single round of the cipher. In our second attack, we present a simplified Grobner basis algorithm to solve the faulty system. We show that this method could totally break SIMON ciphers with only 3 to 5 faults injected. Our third attack combines a fault attack with a modern SAT solver. By guessing some key bits and with only a single fault injected at the round T - 6, where T is the number of rounds of a SIMON cipher, this combined attack could manage to recover a master key of the cipher. For the last two attacks, we perform experiments to demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks. These experiments are implemented on personal computers and run in very reasonable timing.

In this paper, we introduce a new time-memory-data trade-off attack which can perform better than existing ones by Biryukov-Shamir (BS-TMD [1]), Hong-Sarkar (HS-TMD [8]) and Dunkelman-Keller (DK-TMD [5]). Current Estream ciphers are resistant to these attacks because the state size is too big for the BS-TMD attack, while the pre-processing is at least as expensive as exhaustive search for the HS-TMD and DK-TMD attacks.

In this paper the impact of the more recent stream cipher attacks like time-memory-data trade-off attacks and algebraic attacks on filter function keystream generators are studied. The attacks succeed when the filter function is based on concatenation of linear functions. As an alternative, some known constructions based on finite fields which are not susceptible to these attacks are presented. Two new finite field constructions were also introduced, one based on the GMW construction and the other based on an efficient exhaustive search

This paper proposes variants of MMH and SQUARE universal hash functions families over the finite field (Galois field) GF (2/sup n/). These new variants are suited for implementation on platforms where there are no built-in specialized algorithms for modular multiplication. There are especially suited on platforms, which have already an embedded GF (2/sup n/)-based cryptosystem. These variants can be utilized to provide efficient and secure message authentication.