Some of the most powerful language models currently are proprietary systems, accessible only via (typically restrictive) web or software programming interfaces. This is the LanguageModels-as-a-Service (LMaaS) paradigm. In contrast with scenarios where full model access is available, as in the case of open-source models, such closed-off language models present specific challenges for evaluating, benchmarking, and testing them. This paper has two goals: on the one hand, we delineate how the aforementioned challenges act as impediments to the accessibility, reproducibility, reliability, and trustworthiness of LMaaS. We systematically examine the issues that arise from a lack of information about language models for each of these four aspects. We conduct a detailed analysis of existing solutions, put forth a number of recommendations, and highlight directions for future advancements. On the other hand, it serves as a synthesized overview of the licences and capabilities of the most popular LMaaS.

Fangru Lin, Shaoguang Mao, Emanuele La Malfa, Valentin Hofmann, Adrian de Wynter, Xun Wang, Si-Qing Chen, Michael J. Wooldridge, Janet B. Pierrehumbert, Furu Wei. Proceedings of the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2025.

Pre-game communication is a natural and practical way to facilitate coordination among players in the presence of multiple equilibria. We study how localised communication, in the form of a partition where only players within the same coalition can coordinate on a joint action, can improve the social efficiency of the Weighted Singleton Congestion Games, a common type of a strategic resource allocation problem. We assume that players within a coalition can reach an agreement (a pure joint action) if it is credible (no profitable deviation), Pareto-optimal, and envy-free (no player envies the assignment of another player), and that players respect the principle of indifference (i.e., attribute equal probability to symmetric outcomes) about the behaviour of players in other coalitions. Under these assumptions, some partitioning of players induce a unique correlated strategy profile which we term the partition equilibrium. We characterise the set of partition equilibria that can arise in weighted singleton congestion games and show that the optimal partition can significantly improve the worst-case makespan of the game, from an m-approximation of the social-optimal outcome to a 2-approximation.

Language is typically modelled with discrete sequences. However, the most successful approaches to language modelling, namely neural networks, are continuous and smooth function approximators. In this work, we show that Transformer-based language models implicitly learn to represent sentences as continuous-time functions defined over a continuous input space. This phenomenon occurs in most state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama2, Llama3, Phi3, Gemma, Gemma2, and Mistral, and suggests that LLMs reason about language in ways that fundamentally differ from humans. Our work formally extends Transformers to capture the nuances of time and space continuity in both input and output space. Our results challenge the traditional interpretation of how LLMs understand language, with several linguistic and engineering implications.

Simulation modeling offers a flexible approach to constructing high-fidelity synthetic representations of complex real-world systems. However, the increased complexity of such models introduces additional complications, for example when carrying out statistical inference procedures. This has motivated a large and growing literature on likelihood-free or simulation-based inference methods, which approximate (e.g., Bayesian) inference without assuming access to the simulator’s intractable likelihood function. A hitherto neglected problem in the simulation-based Bayesian inference literature is the challenge of constructing minimally informative reference priors for complex simulation models. Such priors maximise an expected Kullback-Leibler distance from the prior to the posterior, thereby influencing posterior inferences minimally and enabling an “objective” approach to Bayesian inference that does not necessitate the incorporation of strong subjective prior beliefs. In this paper, we propose and test a selection of likelihood-free methods for learning reference priors for simulation models, using variational approximations to these priors and a variety of mutual information estimators. Our experiments demonstrate that good approximations to reference priors for simulation models are in this way attainable, providing a first step towards the development of likelihood-free objective Bayesian inference procedures.

Recent interest in Multi-Agent Systems of Large Language Models (MAS LLMs) has led to an increase in frameworks leveraging multiple LLMs to tackle complex tasks. However, much of this literature appropriates the terminology of MAS without engaging with its foundational principles. In this position paper, we highlight critical discrepancies between MAS theory and current MAS LLMs implementations, focusing on four key areas: the social aspect of agency, environment design, coordination and communication protocols, and measuring emergent behaviours. Our position is that many MAS LLMs lack multi-agent characteristics such as autonomy, social interaction, and structured environments, and often rely on oversimplified, LLM-centric architectures. The field may slow down and lose traction by revisiting problems the MAS literature has already addressed. Therefore, we systematically analyse this issue and outline associated research opportunities; we advocate for better integrating established MAS concepts and more precise terminology to avoid mischaracterisation and missed opportunities.

Advanced reasoning models with agentic capabilities (AI agents) are deployed to interact with humans and to solve sequential decision‑making problems under (often approximate) utility functions and internal models. When such problems have resource or failure constraints where action sequences may be forcibly terminated once resources are exhausted, agents face implicit trade‑offs that reshape their utility-driven (rational) behaviour. Additionally, since these agents are typically commissioned by a human principal to act on their behalf, asymmetries in constraint exposure can give rise to previously unanticipated misalignment between human objectives and agent incentives. We formalise this setting through a survival bandit framework, provide theoretical and empirical results that quantify the impact of survival‑driven preference shifts, identify conditions under which misalignment emerges and propose mechanisms to mitigate the emergence of risk-seeking or risk-averse behaviours. As a result, this work aims to increase understanding and interpretability of emergent behaviours of AI agents operating under such survival pressure, and offer guidelines for safely deploying such AI systems in critical resource‑limited environments.

Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both these forms of reasoning has, until now, been lacking. We offer a solution in the form of (structural) causal games, which can be seen as extending Pearl's causal hierarchy to the game-theoretic domain, or as extending Koller and Milch's multi-agent influence diagrams to the causal domain. We then consider three key questions: i) How can the (causal) dependencies in games – either between variables, or between strategies – be modelled in a uniform, principled manner? ii) How may causal queries be computed in causal games, and what assumptions does this require? iii) How do causal games compare to existing formalisms? To address question i), we introduce mechanised games, which encode dependencies between agents' decision rules and the distributions governing the game. In response to question ii), we present definitions of predictions, interventions, and counterfactuals, and discuss the assumptions required for each. Regarding question iii), we describe correspondences between causal games and other formalisms, and explain how causal games can be used to answer queries that other causal or game-theoretic models do not support. Finally, we highlight possible applications of causal games, aided by an extensive open-source Python library.

Concurrent multi-player mean-payoff games are important models for systems of agents with individual, non-dichotomous preferences. Whilst these games have been extensively studied in terms of their equilibria in non-cooperative settings, this paper explores an alternative solution concept: the core from cooperative game theory. This concept is particularly relevant for cooperative AI systems, as it enables the modelling of cooperation among agents, even when their goals are not fully aligned. Our contribution is twofold. First, we provide a characterisation of the core using discrete geometry techniques and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness. We then use the characterisation to prove the existence of polynomial witnesses in the core. Second, we use the existence of such witnesses to solve key decision problems in rational verification and provide tight complexity bounds for the problem of checking whether some/every equilibrium in a game satisfies a given LTL or GR(1) specification. Our approach is general and can be adapted to handle other specifications expressed in various fragments of LTL without incurring additional computational costs.

We introduce Incentive Design: a new class of problems for equilibrium verification in multi-agent systems. In our model, agents attempt to maximize their utility functions, which are expressed as formulae in LTL[F], a quantitative extension of Linear Temporal Logic with functions computable in polynomial time. We assume agents are rational, in the sense that they adopt strategies consistent with game theoretic solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium. For each solution concept we consider, we analyze the problems of verifying whether an incentive scheme achieves a societal objective and finding one that does so, whether it be social welfare or any other aggregate measure of collective well-being. We study both static and dynamic incentive schemes, showing that the latter are more powerful than the former. Finally, we solve the incentive verification and synthesis problems for all the solution concepts we consider, and analyze their complexity.

Large-scale simulation models of complex socio-technical systems provide decision-makers with high-fidelity testbeds in which policy interventions can be evaluated and _what-if_ scenarios explored. Unfortunately, the high computational cost of such models inhibits their widespread use in policy-making settings. Surrogate models can address these computational limitations, but to do so they must behave consistently with the simulator under interventions of interest. In this paper, we build upon recent developments in causal abstractions to develop a framework for learning interventionally consistent surrogate models for large-scale, complex simulation models. We provide theoretical results showing that our proposed approach induces surrogates to behave consistently with high probability with respect to the simulator across interventions of interest, facilitating rapid experimentation with policy interventions in complex systems. We further demonstrate with empirical studies that conventionally trained surrogates can misjudge the effect of interventions and misguide decision-makers towards suboptimal interventions, while surrogates trained for _interventional_ consistency with our method closely mimic the behaviour of the original simulator under interventions of interest.

Causal games are probabilistic graphical models that enable causal queries to be answered in multi-agent settings. They extend causal Bayesian networks by specifying decision and utility variables to represent the agents’ degrees of freedom and objectives. In multi-agent settings, whether each agent decides on their policy before or after knowing the causal intervention is important as this affects whether they can respond to the intervention by adapting their policy. Consequently, previous work in causal games imposed chronological constraints on permissible interventions. We relax this by outlining a sound and complete set of primitive causal interventions so the effect of any arbitrarily complex interventional query can be studied in multi-agent settings. We also demonstrate applications to the design of safe AI systems by considering causal mechanism design and commitment.

Multi-armed bandits (MAB) and causal MABs (CMAB) are established frameworks for decision-making problems. The majority of prior work typically studies and solves individual MAB and CMAB in isolation for a given problem and associated data. However, decision-makers are often faced with multiple related problems and multi-scale observations where joint formulations are needed in order to efficiently exploit the problem structures and data dependencies. Transfer learning for CMABs addresses the situation where models are defined on identical variables, although causal connections may differ. In this work, we extend transfer learning to setups involving CMABs defined on potentially different variables, with varying degrees of granularity, and related via an abstraction map. Formally, we introduce the problem of causally abstracted MABs (CAMABs) by relying on the theory of causal abstraction in order to express a rigorous abstraction map. We propose algorithms to learn in a CAMAB, and study their regret. We illustrate the limitations and the strengths of our algorithms on a real-world scenario related to online advertising.

Social dilemmas are situations of inter-dependent decision making in which individual rationality can lead to outcomes with poor social qualities. The ubiquity of social dilemmas in social, biological, and computational systems has generated substantial research across these diverse disciplines into the study of mechanisms for avoiding deficient outcomes by promoting and maintaining mutual cooperation. Much of this research is focused on studying how individuals faced with a dilemma can learn to cooperate by adapting their behaviours according to their past experience. In particular, three types of learning approaches have been studied: evolutionary game-theoretic learning, reinforcement learning, and best-response learning. This article is a comprehensive integrated survey of these learning approaches in the context of dilemma games. We formally introduce dilemma games and their inherent challenges. We then outline the three learning approaches and, for each approach, provide a survey of the solutions proposed for dilemma resolution. Finally, we provide a comparative summary and discuss directions in which further research is needed.

Some of the most powerful language models currently are proprietary systems, accessible only via (typically restrictive) web or software programming interfaces. This is the LanguageModels-as-a-Service (LMaaS) paradigm. In contrast with scenarios where full model access is available, as in the case of open-source models, such closed-off language models present specific challenges for evaluating, benchmarking, and testing them. This paper has two goals: on the one hand, we delineate how the aforementioned challenges act as impediments to the accessibility, reproducibility, reliability, and trustworthiness of LMaaS. We systematically examine the issues that arise from a lack of information about language models for each of these four aspects. We conduct a detailed analysis of existing solutions, put forth a number of recommendations, and highlight directions for future advancements. On the other hand, it serves as a synthesized overview of the licences and capabilities of the most popular LMaaS.

In financial credit networks, prepayments enable a firm to settle its debt obligations ahead of an agreed-upon due date. Prepayments have a transformative impact on the structure of networks, influencing the financial well-being (utility) of individual firms. This study investigates prepayments from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first establish the computational complexity of finding prepayments that maximize welfare, assuming global coordination among firms in the financial network. Subsequently, our focus shifts to understanding the strategic behavior of individual firms in the presence of prepayments. We introduce a prepayment game where firms strategically make prepayments, delineating the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and analyzing the price of anarchy (stability) within this game. Recognizing the computational challenges associated with determining Nash equilibria in prepayment games, we use a simulation-based approach, known as empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA). Through EGTA, we are able to find Nash equilibria among a carefully-chosen set of heuristic strategies. By examining the equilibrium behavior of firms, we outline the characteristics of high-performing strategies for strategic prepayments and establish connections between our empirical and theoretical findings.

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a desirable equilibrium that satisfies a specific temporal logic property. Our study is based on a framework where system specifications are represented as temporal logic formulae, games as quantitative concurrent game structures, and players' goals as mean-payoff objectives. We consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that designing incentives to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game can be achieved in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/{\Sigma}P 2 for GR(1) specifications. We also examine the complexity of related decision and optimisation problems, such as optimality and uniqueness of solutions, as well as considering social welfare, and show that the complexities of these problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy. Equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to rational synthesis and verification problems for concurrent games with mean-payoff objectives when no solution exists or as a technique to repair concurrent games with undesirable Nash equilibria in an optimal way. Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2106.10192

Sharing scarce resources is a key challenge in multi-agent interaction, especially when individual agents are uncertain about their future consumption. We present a new auction mechanism for preallocating multi-unit resources among agents, while limiting the chance of resource violations. By planning for a chance constraint, we strike a balance between worst-case approaches, which under-utilise resources, and expected-case approaches, which lack formal guarantees. We also present an algorithm that allows agents to generate bids via multi-objective reasoning, which are then submitted to the auction. We then discuss how the auction can be extended to non-cooperative scenarios. Finally, we demonstrate empirically that our auction outperforms state-of-the-art techniques for chance-constrained multi-agent resource allocation in complex settings with up to hundreds of agents.

Training reinforcement learning (RL) agents using scalar reward signals is often infeasible when an environment has sparse and non-Markovian rewards. Moreover, handcrafting these reward functions before training is prone to misspecification. We learn non-Markovian finite task specifications as finite-state ‘task automata’ from episodes of agent experience within environments with unknown dynamics. First, we learn a product MDP, a model composed of the specification’s automaton and the environment’s MDP (both initially unknown), by treating it as a partially observable MDP and employing a hidden Markov model learning algorithm. Second, we efficiently distil the task automaton (assumed to be a deterministic finite automaton) from the learnt product MDP. Our automaton enables a task to be decomposed into sub-tasks, so an RL agent can later synthesise an optimal policy more efficiently. It is also an interpretable encoding of high-level task features, so a human can verify that the agent’s learnt tasks have no misspecifications. Finally, we also take steps towards ensuring that the automaton is environment-agnostic, making it well-suited for use in transfer learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have received enormous attention over the past year and are now used by hundreds of millions of people every day. The rapid adoption of this technology naturally raises questions about the possible biases such models might exhibit. In this work, we tested one of these models (GPT-3) on a range of cognitive effects, which are systematic patterns that are usually found in human cognitive tasks. We found that LLMs are indeed prone to several human cognitive effects. Specifically, we show that the priming, distance, SNARC, and size congruity effects were presented with GPT-3, while the anchoring effect is absent. We describe our methodology, and specifically the way we converted real-world experiments to text-based experiments. Finally, we speculate on the possible reasons why GPT-3 exhibits these effects and discuss whether they are imitated or reinvented.

We introduce and study a computational version of the principal-agent problem -- a classic problem in Economics that arises when a principal desires to contract an agent to carry out some task, but has incomplete information about the agent or their subsequent actions. The key challenge in this setting is for the principal to design a contract for the agent such that the agent's preferences are then aligned with those of the principal. We study this problem using a variation of Boolean games, where multiple players each choose valuations for Boolean variables under their control, seeking the satisfaction of a personal goal formula. In our setting, the principal can only observe some subset of these variables, and the principal chooses a contract which rewards players on the basis of the assignments they make for the variables that are observable to the principal. The principal's challenge is to design a contract so that, firstly, the principal's goal is achieved in some or all Nash equilibrium choices, and secondly, that the principal is able to verify that their goal is satisfied. In this paper, we formally define this problem and completely characterise the computational complexity of the most relevant decision problems associated with it.

In rational verification , the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents (“players”) in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic equilibrium. Preferences are typically defined by assuming that agents act in pursuit of individual goals, specified as temporal logic formulae. To date, rational verification has been studied using non-cooperative solution concepts—Nash equilibrium and refinements thereof. Such non-cooperative solution concepts assume that there is no possibility of agents forming binding agreements to cooperate, and as such they are restricted in their applicability. In this article, we extend rational verification to cooperative solution concepts, as studied in the field of cooperative game theory . We focus on the core , as this is the most fundamental (and most widely studied) cooperative solution concept. We begin by presenting a variant of the core that seems well-suited to the concurrent game setting, and we show that this version of the core can be characterised using ATL ⁎ . We then study the computational complexity of key decision problems associated with the core, which range from problems in PSpace to problems in 3ExpTime . We also investigate conditions that are sufficient to ensure that the core is non-empty, and explore when it is invariant under bisimilarity. We then introduce and study a number of variants of the main definition of the core, leading to the issue of credible deviations, and to stronger notions of collective stable behaviour. Finally, we study cooperative rational verification using an alternative model of preferences, in which players seek to maximise the mean-payoff they obtain over an infinite play in games where quantitative information is allowed.

Causal reasoning and game-theoretic reasoning are fundamental topics in artificial intelligence, among many other disciplines: this paper is concerned with their intersection. Despite their importance, a formal framework that supports both these forms of reasoning has, until now, been lacking. We offer a solution in the form of (structural) causal games, which can be seen as extending Pearl's causal hierarchy to the game-theoretic domain, or as extending Koller and Milch's multi-agent influence diagrams to the causal domain. We then consider three key questions: How can the (causal) dependencies in games – either between variables, or between strategies – be modelled in a uniform, principled manner? How may causal queries be computed in causal games, and what assumptions does this require? How do causal games compare to existing formalisms?

Our aim is to develop a formal semantics for giving instructions to taskable agents, to investigate the complexity of decision problems relating to these semantics, and to explore the issues that these semantics raise. In the setting we consider, agents are given instructions in the form of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulae; the intuitive interpretation of such an instruction is that the agent should act in such a way as to ensure the formula is satisfied. At the same time, agents are assumed to have inviolable and immutable background safety requirements, also specified as LTL formulae. Finally, the actions performed by an agent are assumed to have costs, and agents must act within a limited budget. For this setting, we present a range of interpretations of an instruction to achieve an LTL task Υ, intuitively ranging from “try to do this but only if you can do so with everything else remaining unchanged” up to “drop everything and get this done.” For each case we present a formal pre-/post-condition semantics, and investigate the computational issues that they raise.

Abstract For cooperative games with externalities, the problem of optimally partitioning a set of players into disjoint exhaustive coalitions is called coalition structure generation, and is a fundamental computational problem in multi-agent systems. Coalition structure generation is, in general, computationally hard and a large body of work has therefore investigated the development of efficient solutions for this problem. However, the existing methods are mostly limited to deterministic environments. In this paper, we focus attention on uncertain environments. Specifically, we define probabilistically monotone partition function games, a subclass of the well-known partition function games in which we introduce uncertainty. We provide a constructive proof that an exact optimum can be found using a greedy approach, present an algorithm for finding an optimum, and analyze its time complexity.

Real-world security scenarios sometimes involve multiple defenders: security agencies of two or more countries might patrol the same border areas, and domestic security agencies might also operate in the same locations when their areas of jurisdiction overlap. Motivated by these scenarios and the observation that uncoordinated movements of the defenders may lead to an inefficient defense, we introduce a model of multi-defender security games and explore the possibility of improving efficiency by coordinating the defenders — specifically, by pooling the defenders' resources and allocating them jointly. The model generalizes the standard model of Stackelberg security games, where a defender (now a group of defenders) allocates security resources to protect a set of targets, and an attacker picks the best target to attack. In particular, we are interested in the situation with heterogeneous defenders, who may value the same target differently. Our task is twofold. First, we need to develop a good understanding of the uncoordinated situation, as the baseline to be improved. To this end we formulate a new equilibrium concept, and prove that an equilibrium under this concept always exists and can be computed efficiently. Second, to coordinate the heterogeneous defenders we take a mechanism design perspective and aim to find a mechanism to generate joint resource allocation strategies. We seek a mechanism that improves the defenders' utilities upon the uncoordinated baseline, achieves Pareto efficiency, and incentivizes the defenders to report their true incentives and execute the recommended strategies. Our analysis establishes several impossibility results, which indicate the intrinsic difficulties of defense coordination. Specifically, we show that even the basic properties listed above are in conflict with each other: no mechanism can simultaneously satisfy them all, or even some proper subsets of them. In terms of positive results, we present mechanisms that satisfy all combinations of the properties that are not ruled out by our impossibility results, thereby providing a comprehensive profile of the mechanism design problem with respect to the properties considered.

Centrality measures are the most commonly advocated social network analysis tools for identifying leaders of covert organizations. While the literature has predominantly focused on studying the effectiveness of existing centrality measures or developing new ones, we study the problem from the opposite perspective, by focusing on how a group of leaders can avoid being identified by centrality measures as key members of a covert network. More specifically, we analyze the problem of choosing a set of edges to be added to a network to decrease the leaders’ ranking according to three fundamental centrality measures, namely, degree, closeness, and betweenness. We prove that this problem is NP-complete for each measure. Moreover, we study how the leaders can construct a network from scratch, designed specifically to keep them hidden from centrality measures. We identify a network structure that not only guarantees to hide the leaders to a certain extent but also allows them to spread their influence across the network.

Rational verification is the problem of determining which temporal logic properties will hold in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents in the system act rationally, by choosing strategies that collectively form a game-theoretic equilibrium. Previous work in this area has largely focussed on deterministic systems. In this paper, we develop the theory and algorithms for rational verification in probabilistic systems. We focus on concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), which can be used to model uncertainty and randomness in complex multi-agent environments. We study the rational verification problem for both non-cooperative games and cooperative games in the qualitative probabilistic setting. In the former case, we consider LTL properties satisfied by the Nash equilibria of the game and in the latter case LTL properties satisfied by the core. In both cases, we show that the problem is 2EXPTIME-complete, thus not harder than the much simpler verification problem of model checking LTL properties of systems modelled as Markov decision processes (MDPs).

Abstract We provide a survey of the state of the art ofrational verification: the problem of checking whether a given temporal logic formulaϕis satisfied in some or all game-theoretic equilibria of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behaviorϕrepresents under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the overall framework of rational verification, we discuss key results obtained in the past few years as well as relevant related work in logic, AI, and computer science.

We define and investigate a novel notion of expressiveness for temporal logics that is based on game theoretic equilibria of multi-agent systems. We use iterated Boolean games as our abstract model of multi-agent systems [Gutierrez et al. 2013, 2015a]. In such a game, each agent <?TeX $i$?> has a goal <?TeX $\gamma _i$?> , represented using (a fragment of) Linear Temporal Logic ( <?TeX $\mathrm{LTL}$?> ) . The goal <?TeX $\gamma _i$?> captures agent <?TeX $i$?> ’s preferences, in the sense that the models of <?TeX $\gamma _i$?> represent system behaviours that would satisfy <?TeX $i$?> . Each player controls a subset of Boolean variables <?TeX $\Phi _i$?> , and at each round in the game, player <?TeX $i$?> is at liberty to choose values for variables <?TeX $\Phi _i$?> in any way that she sees fit. Play continues for an infinite sequence of rounds, and so as players act they collectively trace out a model for <?TeX $\mathrm{LTL}$?> , which for every player will either satisfy or fail to satisfy their goal. Players are assumed to act strategically, taking into account the goals of other players, in an attempt to bring about computations satisfying their goal. In this setting, we apply the standard game-theoretic concept of (pure) Nash equilibria. The (possibly empty) set of Nash equilibria of an iterated Boolean game can be understood as inducing a set of computations, each computation representing one way the system could evolve if players chose strategies that together constitute a Nash equilibrium. Such a set of equilibrium computations expresses a temporal property—which may or may not be expressible within a particular <?TeX $\mathrm{LTL}$?> fragment. The new notion of expressiveness that we formally define and investigate is then as follows: What temporal properties are characterised by the Nash equilibria of games in which agent goals are expressed in specific fragments of <?TeX $\mathrm{LTL}$?> ? We formally define and investigate this notion of expressiveness for a range of <?TeX $\mathrm{LTL}$?> fragments. For example, a very natural question is the following: Suppose we have an iterated Boolean game in which every goal is represented using a particular fragment <?TeX $L$?> of <?TeX $\mathrm{LTL}$?> : is it then always the case that the equilibria of the game can be characterised within <?TeX $L$?> ? We show that this is not true in general.

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance, an equilibrium satisfying a given temporal logic property - a problem that we call equilibrium design. We base our study on a framework where system specifications are represented as temporal logic formulae, games as quantitative concurrent game structures, and players' goals as mean-payoff objectives. In particular, we consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that implementing a mechanism to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game, whenever such a mechanism exists, can be done in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/Sigma^P_2 for GR(1) specifications. We also study the complexity of various related decision and optimisation problems, such as optimality and uniqueness of solutions, and show that the complexities of all such problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy. As an application, equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to the rational synthesis and verification problems for concurrent games with mean-payoff objectives whenever no solution exists, or as a technique to repair, whenever possible, concurrent games with undesirable rational outcomes (Nash equilibria) in an optimal way.

Rational verification involves checking which temporal logic properties hold of a concurrent and multiagent system, under the assumption that agents in the system choose strategies in game theoretic equilibrium. Rational verification can be understood as a counterpart of model checking for multiagent systems, but while model checking can be done in polynomial time for some temporal logic specification languages such as CTL, and polynomial space with LTL specifications, rational verification is much more intractable: it is 2EXPTIME-complete with LTL specifications, even when using explicit-state system representations. In this paper we show that the complexity of rational verification can be greatly reduced by restricting specifications to GR(1), a fragment of LTL that can represent most response properties of reactive systems. We also provide improved complexity results for rational verification when considering players' goals given by mean-payoff utility functions -- arguably the most widely used quantitative objective for agents in concurrent and multiagent systems. In particular, we show that for a number of relevant settings, rational verification can be done in polynomial space or even in polynomial time.

In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this paper, we show that, however, these algorithms can be easily manipulated if the attacker responds untruthfully. As a key finding, attacker manipulation normally leads to the defender learning a maximin strategy, which effectively renders the learning attempt meaningless as to compute a maximin strategy requires no additional information about the other player at all. We then apply a game-theoretic framework at a higher level to counteract such manipulation, in which the defender commits to a policy that specifies her strategy commitment according to the learned information. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal such policy, and in addition, a heuristic approach that applies even when the attacker's payoff space is infinite or completely unknown. Empirical evaluation shows that our approaches can improve the defender's utility significantly as compared to the situation when attacker manipulation is ignored.

The optimal coalition structure determination problem is in general computationally hard. In this article, we identify some problem instances for which the space of possible coalition structures has a certain form and constructively prove that the problem is polynomial time solvable. Specifically, we consider games with an ordering over the players and introduce a distance metric for measuring the distance between any two structures. In terms of this metric, we define the property of monotonicity , meaning that coalition structures closer to the optimal, as measured by the metric, have higher value than those further away. Similarly, quasi-monotonicity means that part of the space of coalition structures is monotonic, while part of it is non-monotonic. (Quasi)-monotonicity is a property that can be satisfied by coalition games in characteristic function form and also those in partition function form. For a setting with a monotonic value function and a known player ordering, we prove that the optimal coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm using a greedy approach. We extend this algorithm to quasi-monotonic value functions and demonstrate how its time complexity improves from exponential to polynomial as the degree of monotonicity of the value function increases. We go further and consider a setting in which the value function is monotonic and an ordering over the players is known to exist but ordering itself is unknown. For this setting too, we prove that the coalition structure determination problem is polynomial time solvable and devise such an algorithm.

Abstract We develop a logic for reasoning about semi-public environments , i.e. environments in which a process is executing, and where agents in the environment have partial and potentially different views of the process. Previous work on this problem illustrated that it was problematic to obtain both an adequate semantic model and a language for reasoning about semi-public environments. We here use program models for representing the changes that occur during the execution of a program. These models serve both as syntactic objects and as semantic models, and are a modification of action models in Dynamic Epistemic Logic, in the sense that they allow for ontic change (i.e. change in the world or state). We show how program models can elegantly capture a notion of observation of the environment. The use of these models resolves several difficulties identified in earlier work, and admit a much simpler treatment than was possible in previous work on semi-public environments.

The intuitive notion of added value in groups represents a fundamental property of biological, physical, and economic systems: how the interaction or cooperation of multiple entities, substances, or other agents can produce synergistic effects. However, despite the ubiquity of group formation, a well-founded measure of added value has remained elusive. Here, we propose such a measure inspired by the Shapley value —a fundamental solution concept from Cooperative Game Theory. To this end, we start by developing a solution concept that measures the average impact of each player in a coalitional game and show how this measure uniquely satisfies a set of intuitive properties. Then, building upon our solution concept, we propose a measure of added value that not only analyzes the interactions of players inside their group, but also outside it, thereby reflecting otherwise-hidden information about how these individuals typically perform in various groups of the population.

At the heart of multi-agent systems is the ability to cooperate to improve the performance of individual agents and/or the system as a whole. While a widespread assumption in the literature is that such cooperation is essentially unrestricted, in many realistic settings this assumption does not hold. A highly influential approach for modelling such scenarios are graph-restricted games introduced by Myerson [36]. In this approach, agents are represented by nodes in a graph, edges represent communication channels, and a group can generate an arbitrary value only if there exists a direct or indirect communication channel between every pair of agents within the group. Two fundamental solution-concepts that were proposed for such games are the Myerson value and the Shapley value . While an algorithm has been developed to compute the Shapley value in arbitrary graph-restricted games, no such general-purpose algorithm has been developed for the Myerson value to date. With this in mind, we set out to develop for such games a general-purpose algorithm to compute the Myerson value, and a more efficient algorithm to compute the Shapley value. Since the computation of either value involves enumerating all connected induced subgraphs of the game’s underlying graph, we start by developing an algorithm dedicated to this enumeration, and then we show empirically that it is faster than the state of the art in the literature. Finally, we present a sample application of both algorithms, in which we test the Myerson value and the Shapley value as advanced measures of node centrality in networks.

Norms constitute regulative mechanisms extensively enacted in groups, organisations, and societies. However, 'choosing the right norms to establish' constitutes an open problem that requires the consideration of a number of constraints (such as norm relations) and preference criteria (e.g over involved moral values). This paper advances the state of the art in the Normative Multiagent Systems literature by formally defining this problem and by proposing its encoding as a linear program so that it can be automatically solved.

Within the area of multi-agent systems, normative systems are a widely used framework for the coordination of interdependent activities. A crucial problem associated with normative systems is that of synthesising norms that will effectively accomplish a coordination task and that the agents will comply with. Many works in the literature focus on the on-line synthesis of a single, evolutionarily stable norm (convention) whose compliance forms a rational choice for the agents and that effectively coordinates them in one particular coordination situation that needs to be identified and modelled as a game in advance. In this work, we introduce a framework for the automatic off-line synthesis of evolutionarily stable normative systems that coordinate the agents in multiple interdependent coordination situations that cannot be easily identified in advance nor resolved separately. Our framework roots in evolutionary game theory. It considers multi-agent systems in which the potential conflict situations can be automatically enumerated by employing MAS simulations along with basic domain information. Our framework simulates an evolutionary process whereby successful norms prosper and spread within the agent population, while unsuccessful norms are discarded. The outputs of such a natural selection process are sets of codependent norms that, together, effectively coordinate the agents in multiple interdependent situations and are evolutionarily stable. We empirically show the effectiveness of our approach through empirical evaluation in a simulated traffic domain.

Some game-theoretic solution concepts such as the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index have recently gained popularity as measures of node centrality in networks. While this direction of research is promising, the computational problems that surround it are challenging and have largely been left open. To date there are only a few positive results in the literature, which show that some game-theoretic extensions of degree-, closeness- and betweenness-centrality measures are computable in polynomial time, i.e., without the need to enumerate the exponential number of all possible coalitions. In this article, we show that these results can be extended to a much larger class of centrality measures that are based on a family of solution concepts known as semivalues. The family of semivalues includes, among others, the Shapley value and the Banzhaf index. To this end, we present a generic framework for defining game-theoretic network centralities and prove that all centrality measures that can be expressed in this framework are computable in polynomial time. Using our framework, we present a number of new and polynomial-time computable game-theoretic centrality measures.

How can individuals and communities protect their privacy against social network analysis tools? How do criminals or terrorists organizations evade detection by such tools? Under which conditions can these tools be made strategy proof? These fundamental questions have attracted little attention in the literature to date, as most social network analysis tools are built around the assumption that individuals or groups in a network do not act strategically to evade such tools. With this in mind, we outline in this paper a new paradigm for social network analysis, whereby the strategic behaviour of network actors is explicitly modeled. Addressing this research challenge has various implications. For instance, it may allow two individuals to keep their relationship secret or private. It may also allow members of an activist group to conceal their membership, or even conceal the existence of their group from authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, it may assist security agencies and counter terrorism units in understanding the strategies that covert organizations use to escape detection, and give rise to new strategy-proof countermeasures.

Game theory provides a well-established framework for the analysis of concurrent and multi-agent systems. The basic idea is that concurrent processes (agents) can be understood as corresponding to players in a game; plays represent the possible computation runs of the system; and strategies define the behaviour of agents. Typically, strategies are modelled as functions from sequences of system states to player actions. Analysing a system in such a way involves computing the set of (Nash) equilibria in the game. However, we show that, with respect to the above model of strategies---the standard model in the literature---bisimilarity does not preserve the existence of Nash equilibria. Thus, two concurrent games which are behaviourally equivalent from a semantic perspective, and which from a logical perspective satisfy the same temporal formulae, nevertheless have fundamentally different properties from a game theoretic perspective. In this paper we explore the issues raised by this discovery, and investigate three models of strategies with respect to which the existence of Nash equilibria is preserved under bisimilarity. We also use some of these models of strategies to provide new semantic foundations for logics for strategic reasoning, and investigate restricted scenarios where bisimilarity can be shown to preserve the existence of Nash equilibria with respect to the conventional model of strategies in the literature.

We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Buchi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Buchi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decidable, even if players' deviations are implemented as infinite memory strategies.

The existence of (Nash) equilibria with undesirable properties is a well-known problem in game theory, which has motivated much research directed at the possibility of mechanisms for modifying games in order to eliminate undesirable equilibria, or induce desirable ones. Taxation schemes are a well-known mechanism for modifying games in this way. In the multi-agent systems community, taxation mechanisms for incentive engineering have been studied in the context of Boolean games with costs. These are games in which each player assigns truth-values to a set of propositional variables she uniquely controls in pursuit of satisfying an individual propositional goal formula; different choices for the player are also associated with different costs. In such a game, each player prefers primarily to see the satisfaction of their goal, and secondarily, to minimise the cost of their choice, thereby giving rise to lexicographic preferences over goal-satisfaction and costs. Within this setting, where taxes operate on costs only, however, it may well happen that the elimination or introduction of equilibria can only be achieved at the cost of simultaneously introducing less desirable equilibria or eliminating more attractive ones. Although this framework has been studied extensively, the problem of precisely characterising the equilibria that may be induced or eliminated has remained open. In this paper we close this problem, giving a complete characterisation of those mechanisms that can induce a set of outcomes of the game to be exactly the set of Nash Equilibrium outcomes.

Certain real-life networks have a community structure in which communities overlap. For example, a typical bus network includes bus stops (nodes), which belong to one or more bus lines (communities) that often overlap. Clearly, it is important to take this information into account when measuring the centrality of a bus stop - how important it is to the functioning of the network. For example, if a certain stop becomes inaccessible, the impact will depend in part on the bus lines that visit it. However, existing centrality measures do not take such information into account. Our aim is to bridge this gap. We begin by developing a new game-theoretic solution concept, which we call the Configuration semivalue, in order to have greater flexibility in modelling the community structure compared to previous solution concepts from cooperative game theory. We then use the new concept as a building block to construct the first extension of Closeness centrality to networks with community structure (overlapping or otherwise). Despite the computational complexity inherited from the Configuration semivalue, we show that the corresponding extension of Closeness centrality can be computed in polynomial time. We empirically evaluate this measure and our algorithm that computes it by analysing the Warsaw public transportation network.

Rational verification is concerned with establishing whether a given temporal logic formula φ is satisfied in some or all equilibrium computations of a multi-agent system – that is, whether the system will exhibit the behaviour φ under the assumption that agents within the system act rationally in pursuit of their preferences. After motivating and introducing the framework of rational verification, we present formal models through which rational verification can be studied, and survey the complexity of key decision problems. We give an overview of a prototype software tool for rational verification, and conclude with a discussion and related work.

The coalition structure generation problem is one of the key challenges in multi-agent coalition formation. It involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that system performance is optimized. To date, the multi-agent systems literature has focused exclusively on the utilitarian version of this problem which seeks to maximize the sum of the values of the coalitions involved. However, there are many examples of situations in which other performance metrics are of interest. In particular, in games with non-transferable utility, we may be more interested in an egalitarian optimal coalition structure, or in minimizing the difference between the utilities of the most affluent and poorest agents. In this paper, we present a number of exact algorithms to solve such non-utilitarian formulations of the coalition structure generation problem.

Link prediction is a key problem in social network analysis: it involves making suggestions about where to add new links in a network, based solely on the structure of the network. We address a special case of this problem, whereby the new links are supposed to connect different communities in the network; we call it the interlinks prediction problem. This is particularly challenging as there are typically very few links between different communities. To solve this problem, we propose a local node-similarity measure, inspired by the Owen-value interaction index—a concept developed in cooperative game theory and fuzzy systems. Although this index requires an exponential number of operations in the general case, we show that our local node-similarity measure is computable in polynomial time. We apply our measure to solve the inter-links prediction problem in a number of real-life networks, and show that it outperforms all other local similarity measures in the literature.

We propose a novel representation for coalitional games with externalities, called Partition Decision Trees. This representation is based on rooted directed trees, where non-leaf nodes are labelled with agents' names, leaf nodes are labelled with payoff vectors, and edges indicate membership of agents in coalitions. We show that this representation is fully expressive, and for certain classes of games significantly more concise than an extensive representation. Most importantly, Partition Decision Trees are the first formalism in the literature under which most of the direct extensions of the Shapley value to games with externalities can be computed in polynomial time.

Solution concepts from cooperative game theory, such as the Shapley value or the Banzhaf index, have recently been advocated as interesting extensions of standard measures of node centrality in networks. While this direction of research is promising, the computation of game-theoretic centrality can be challenging. In an attempt to address the computational issues of game-theoretic network centrality, we present a generic framework for constructing game-theoretic network centralities. We prove that all extensions that can be expressed in this framework are computable in polynomial time. Using our framework, we present the first game-theoretic extensions of weighted and normalized degree centralities, impact factor centrality,distance-scaled and normalized betweenness centrality,and closeness and normalized closeness centralities.

This paper presents a range of expressiveness and complexity results for the specification, computation, and verification of Nash equilibria in multi-player non-zero-sum concurrent games in which players have goals expressed as temporal logic formulae. Our results are based on a novel approach to the characterisation of equilibria in such games: a semantic characterisation based on winning strategies and memoryful reasoning. This characterisation allows us to obtain a number of other results relating to the analysis of equilibrium properties in temporal logic. We show that, up to bisimilarity, reasoning about Nash equilibria in multi-player non-zero-sum concurrent games can be done in ATL^* and that constructing equilibrium strategy profiles in such games can be done in 2EXPTIME using finite-memory strategies. We also study two simpler cases, two-player games and sequential games, and show that the specification of equilibria in the latter setting can be obtained in a temporal logic that is weaker than ATL^*. Based on these results, we settle a few open problems, put forward new logical characterisations of equilibria, and provide improved answers and alternative solutions to a number of questions.

Most normative systems make use of explicit representations of norms (namely, obligations, prohibitions, and permissions) and associated mechanisms to support the self-regulation of open societies of self-interested and autonomous agents. A key problem in research on normative systems is that of how to synthesise effective and efficient norms. Manually designing norms is time consuming and error prone. An alternative is to automatically synthesise norms. However, norm synthesis is a computationally complex problem. We present a novel online norm synthesis mechanism, designed to synthesise compact normative systems. It yields normative systems composed of concise (simple) norms that effectively coordinate a multiagent system (MAS) without lapsing into overregulation. Our mechanism is based on a central authority that monitors a MAS, searching for undesired states. After detecting undesirable states, the central authority then synthesises norms aimed to avoid them in the future. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through experimental results.

Boolean games provide a simple, compact, and theoretically attractive abstract model for studying multiagent interactions in settings where players will act strategically in an attempt to achieve individual goals. A standard critique of Boolean games, however, is that the strictly dichotomous nature of the preference relations induced by Boolean goals inevitably trivialises the nature of such strategic interactions: a player is assumed to be indifferent between all outcomes that satisfy her goal, and indifferent between all outcomes that do not satisfy her goal. While various proposals have been made to overcome this limitation, many of these proposals require the inclusion of nonlogical structures into games to capture nondichotomous preferences. In this article, we introduce Łukasiewicz games, which overcome this limitation by allowing goals to be specified using Łukasiewicz logics . By expressing goals as formulae of Łukasiewicz logics, we can express a much richer class of utility functions for players than is possible using classical Boolean logic: we can express every continuous piecewise linear polynomial function with rational coefficients over [0, 1] n as well as their finite-valued restrictions over {0, 1/ k , …, ( k − 1)/ k , 1} n . We thus obtain a representation of nondichotomous preference structures within a purely logical framework. After introducing the formal framework of Łukasiewicz games, we present a number of detailed worked examples to illustrate the framework, and then investigate some of their theoretical properties. In particular, we present a logical characterisation of the existence of Nash equilibria in finite and infinite Łukasiewicz games. We conclude by briefly discussing issues of computational complexity.

Many multiagent settings require a collection of agents to partition themselves into coalitions. In such cases, the agents may have conflicting preferences over the possible coalition structures that may form. We investigate a noncooperative bargaining game to allow the agents to resolve such conflicts and partition themselves into non-overlapping coalitions. The game has a finite horizon and is played over discrete time periods. The bargaining agenda is defined exogenously. An important element of the game is a parameter 0≤δ≤1 that represents the probability that bargaining ends in a given round. Thus, δ is a measure of the degree of democracy (ranging from democracy for δ=0, through increasing levels of authoritarianism as δ approaches 1, to dictatorship for δ=1). For this game, we focus on the question of how a player's position on the agenda affects his power. We also analyse the relation between the distribution of the power of individual players, the level of democracy, and the welfare efficiency of the game. Surprisingly, we find that purely democratic games are welfare inefficient due to an uneven distribution of power among the individual players. Interestingly, introducing a degree of authoritarianism into the game makes the distribution of power more equitable and maximizes welfare.

We address the problem of how a group of agents can decide to share a resource, represented as a unit-sized pie. We investigate a finite horizon non-cooperative bargaining game, in which the players take it in turns to make proposals on how the resource should be allocated, and the other players vote on whether or not to accept the allocation. Voting is modelled as a Bayesian weighted voting game with uncertainty about the players' weights. The agenda, (i.e., the order in which the players are called to make offers), is defined exogenously. We focus on impatient players with heterogeneous discount factors. In the case of a conflict, (i.e., no agreement by the deadline), all the players get nothing. We provide a Bayesian subgame perfect equilibrium for the bargaining game and conduct an ex-ante analysis of the resulting outcome. We show that, the equilibrium is unique, computable in polynomial time, results in an instant Pareto optimal agreement, and, under certain conditions provides a foundation for the core of the Bayesian voting game. Our analysis also leads to insights on how an individual's bargained share is influenced by his position on the agenda. Finally, we show that, if the conflict point of the bargaining game changes, then the problem of determining a non-cooperative equilibrium becomes NP-hard even under the perfect information assumption.

There is currently much interest in the problem of measuring the centrality of nodes in networks/graphs; such measures have a range of applications, from social network analysis, to chemistry and biology. In this paper we propose the first measure of node centrality that takes into account the community structure of the underlying network. Our measure builds upon the recent literature on game-theoretic centralities, where solution concepts from cooperative game theory are used to reason about importance of nodes in the network. To allow for flexible modelling of community structures, we propose a generalization of the Owen value—a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory to study games with a priori-given unions of players. As a result we obtain the first measure of centrality that accounts for both the value of an individual node's relationships within the network and the quality of the community this node belongs to.

This article investigates the conjecture that agents who make decisions in scenarios where trust is important can benefit from the use of asocial structure, representing the social relationships that exist between agents. We propose techniques that can be used by agents to initially build and then progressively update such a structure in the light of experience. We describe an implementation of our techniques in the domain of the Agent ART testbed: we take two existing agents for this domain (“Simplet” and “Connected”) and compare their performance with versions that use our social structure (“SocialSimplet” and “SocialConnected”). We show that SocialSimplet and SocialConnected outperform their counterparts with respect to the quality of the interactions, the number of rounds won in a competition, and the total utility gained.

Argument aggregation is the problem of combining argumentation frameworks. An argument aggregation procedure takes as input an argument framework for each agent in a system, intuitively representing the beliefs of that agent with respect to a disputed domain of discourse; the output is an argumentation framework that represents the social position on the domain of discourse. There are clear analogies between argument aggregation and the well-known preference aggregation problem, which has been extensively studied in the social choice community. The first contribution of this paper is to apply some of the methodology developed in social choice theory to argument aggregation. After recalling the basic framework of Dung's abstract argument systems, and introducing the argument aggregation problem, we motivate and formally define a collection of axioms that specific argument aggregation procedures might or might not satisfy. The second contribution of the paper is to consider the analysis of argument aggregation procedures with respect to these various axioms. We consider a natural representation for argument aggregation procedures, based on Boolean circuits. We then investigate the problem of verifying whether an argument aggregation procedure, presented in this way, does or does not satisfy a number of the axioms we introduced.

Weighted voting games (WVGs) are an important mechanism for modeling scenarios where a group of agents must reach agreement on some issue over which they have different preferences. However, for such games to be effective, they must be well designed. Thus, a key concern for a mechanism designer is to structure games so that they have certain desirable properties. In this context, two such properties are proper and strong. A game is proper if for every coalition that is winning, its complement is not. A game is strong if for every coalition that is losing, its complement is not. In most cases, a mechanism designer wants games that are both proper and strong. To this end, we first show that the problem of determining whether a game is proper or strong is, in general, np-hard. Then we determine those conditions (that can be evaluated in polynomial time) under which a given WVG is proper and those under which it is strong. Finally, for the general np-hard case, we discuss two different approaches for overcoming the complexity: a deterministic approximation scheme and a randomized approximation method.

The conventional model of coalition formation considers every possible subset of agents as a potential coalition. However, in many real-world applications, there are inherent constraints on feasible coalitions: for instance, certain agents may be prohibited from being in the same coalition, or the coalition structure may be required to consist of coalitions of the same size. In this paper, we present the first systematic study of constrained coalition formation (CCF). We propose a general framework for this problem, and identify an important class of CCF settings, where the constraints specify which groups of agents should/should not work together. We describe a procedure that transforms such constraints into a structured input that allows coalition formation algorithms to identify, without any redundant computations, all the feasible coalitions. We then use this procedure to develop an algorithm for generating an optimal (welfare-maximizing) constrained coalition structure, and show that it outperforms existing state-of-the-art approaches by several orders of magnitude.

We investigate the problem of influencing the preferences of players within a Boolean game so that, if all players act rationally, certain desirable outcomes will result. The way in which we influence preferences is by overlaying games with taxation schemes. In a Boolean game, each player has unique control of a set of Boolean variables, and the choices available to the player correspond to the possible assignments that may be made to these variables. Each player also has a goal, represented by a Boolean formula, that they desire to see satisfied. Whether or not a player’s goal is satisfied will depend both on their own choices and on the choices of others, which gives Boolean games their strategic character. We extend this basic framework by introducing an external principal who is able to levy a taxation scheme on the game, which imposes a cost on every possible action that a player can choose. By designing a taxation scheme appropriately, it is possible to perturb the preferences of the players, so that they are incentivised to choose some equilibrium that would not otherwise be chosen. After motivating and formally presenting our model, we explore some issues surrounding it, including the complexity of finding a taxation scheme that implements some socially desirable outcome, and then discuss desirable properties of taxation schemes.

Intentions have been widely studied in AI, both in the context of decision-making within individual agents and in multi-agent systems. Work on intentions in multi-agent systems has focused on joint intention models, which characterise the mental state of agents with a shared goal engaged in teamwork. In the absence of shared goals, however, intentions play another crucial role in multi-agent activity: they provide a basis around which agents can mutually coordinate activities. Models based on shared goals do not attempt to account for or explain this role of intentions. In this paper, we present a formal model of multi-agent systems in which belief-desire-intention agents choose their intentions taking into account the intentions of others. To understand rational mental states in such a setting, we formally define and investigate notions of multi-agent intention equilibrium, which are related to equilibrium concepts in game theory.

We present DCL-PC: a logic for reasoning about how the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents are altered by transferring control from one agent to another. The logical foundation of DCL-PC is CL-PC, a logic for reasoning about cooperation in which the abilities of agents and coalitions of agents stem from a distribution of atomic Boolean variables to individual agents -- the choices available to a coalition correspond to assignments to the variables the coalition controls. The basic modal constructs of DCL-PC are of the form `coalition C can cooperate to bring about phi'. DCL-PC extends CL-PC with dynamic logic modalities in which atomic programs are of the form `agent i gives control of variable p to agent j'; as usual in dynamic logic, these atomic programs may be combined using sequence, iteration, choice, and test operators to form complex programs. By combining such dynamic transfer programs with cooperation modalities, it becomes possible to reason about how the power of agents and coalitions is affected by the transfer of control. We give two alternative semantics for the logic: a `direct' semantics, in which we capture the distributions of Boolean variables to agents; and a more conventional Kripke semantics. We prove that these semantics are equivalent, and then present an axiomatization for the logic. We investigate the computational complexity of model checking and satisfiability for DCL-PC, and show that both problems are PSPACE-complete (and hence no worse than the underlying logic CL-PC). Finally, we investigate the characterisation of control in DCL-PC. We distinguish between first-order control -- the ability of an agent or coalition to control some state of affairs through the assignment of values to the variables under the control of the agent or coalition -- and second-order control -- the ability of an agent to exert control over the control that other agents have by transferring variables to other agents. We give a logical characterisation of second-order control.

We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multi-agent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other co-existing coalitions). In addition to the conventional partition function game representation (PFG), we propose a number of new representations based on a new notion of externalities. In contrast to conventional game theory, our new concept is not related to the process by which the coalitions are formed, but rather to the effect that each coalition may have on the entire system and vice versa. We show that the new representations are fully expressive and, for many classes of games, more concise than the conventional PFG. Building upon these new representations, we propose a number of approaches to solve the coalition structure generation problem in systems with externalities. We show that, if externalities are characterised by various degrees of regularity, the new representations allow us to adapt coalition structure generation algorithms that were originally designed for domains with no externalities, so that they can be used when externalities are present. Finally, building upon Rahwan et al. [16] and Michalak et al. [9], we present a unified method to solve the coalition structure generation problem in any system, with or without externalities, provided sufficient information is available.

We introduce a logic designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We give a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We show the decidability of the logic and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.

Programming languages designed specifically for multi-agent systems represent a new programming paradigm that has gained popularity over recent years, with some multi-agent programming languages being used in increasingly sophisticated applications, often in critical areas. To support this, we have developed a set of tools to allow the use of model-checking techniques in the verification of systems directly implemented in one particular language called AgentSpeak. The success of model checking as a verification technique for large software systems is dependent partly on its use in combination with various state-space reduction techniques, an important example of which is property-based slicing. This article introduces an algorithm for property-based slicing of AgentSpeak multi-agent systems. The algorithm uses literal dependence graphs, as developed for slicing logic programs, and generates a program slice whose state space is stuttering-equivalent to that of the original program; the slicing criterion is a property in a logic with LTL operators and (shallow) BDI modalities. In addition to showing correctness and characterizing the complexity of the slicing algorithm, we apply it to an AgentSpeak program based on autonomous planetary exploration rovers, and we discuss how slicing reduces the model-checking state space. The experiment results show a significant reduction in the state space required for model checking that agent, thus indicating that this approach can have an important impact on the future practicality of agent verification.

The Game Description Language (GDL) is a special purpose declarative language for defining games. GDL is used in the AAAI General Game Playing Competition, which tests the ability of computer programs to play games in general, rather than just the ability to play a specific game. Participants in the competition are provided with a previously unknown game specified in GDL, and are required to dynamically and autonomously determine how best to play this game. Recently, there has been much interest in the use of strategic cooperation logics for reasoning about game-like scenarios—the Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman is perhaps the best known example. Such logics are specifically intended to support reasoning about game-theoretic properties of multi-agent systems. In short, the aim of this article is to make a concrete link between ATL and GDL, with the ultimate goal of using ATL to reason about GDL-specified games. We make the following contributions. First, we demonstrate that GDL can be understood as a specification language for ATL models, and prove that the problem of interpreting ATL formulae over propositional GDL descriptions is EXPTIME-complete. Second, we use ATL to characterize a class of ‘fair playability’ conditions, which might or might not hold of various games.

The authors are grateful for financial support received from the UK EP-SRC through the project Market-Based Control of Complex Computational Systems (GR/T10657/01). The authors are also thankful to Jennifer McManus, School of English, University of Liverpool for excellent editorial assistance.

We introduce ATLES - a variant of ATL with explicit names for strategies in the object language. ATLES makes it possible to refer to the same strategy in different occurrences of path quantifiers, and, as a consequence, it possible to express in ATLES some properties that cannot be expressed even in ATL*. We present a complete axiomatic system for ATLES. Moreover, we show that satisfiability problem for ATLES is no more complex than for ATL: it is ExpTime-complete. We identify two variants of the model-checking problem for ATLES and investigate their computational complexity. Finally, we show how ATLES can be used to reason about extensive games.

Research on agent communication languages has typically taken the speech acts paradigm as its starting point. Despite their manifest attractions, speech-act models of communication have several serious disadvantages as a foundation for communication in artificial agent systems. In particular, it has proved to be extremely difficult to give a satisfactory semantics to speech-act based agent communication languages. In part, the problem is that speech-act semantics typically make reference to the "mental states" of agents (their beliefs, desires, and intentions), and there is in general no way to attribute such attitudes to arbitrary computational agents. In addition, agent programming languages have only had their semantics formalised for abstract, stand-alone versions, neglecting aspects such as communication primitives. With respect to communication, implemented agent programming languages have tended to be rather ad hoc. This paper addresses both of these problems, by giving semantics to speech-act based messages received by an AgentSpeak agent. AgentSpeak is a logic-based agent programming language which incorporates the main features of the PRS model of reactive planning systems. The paper builds upon a structural operational semantics to AgentSpeak that we developed in previous work. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: an extension of our earlier work on the theoretical foundations of AgentSpeak interpreters; a computationally grounded semantics for (the core) performatives used in speech-act based agent communication languages; and a well-defined extension of AgentSpeak that supports agent communication.

In a survey on the theory and practice of agent system deployment, conducted by the AgentLink workgroup on networked agents, it was found that there are an increasing number of initiatives for the migration of agents research towards new Internet technologies such as the semantic web, Grid, and Web services. In fact, Grid computing and multi-agent systems research have similar objectives. They both aim to achieve “large-scale open distributed systems, capable of being able to effectively and dynamically deploy and redeploy computational (and other) resources as required, to solve computationally complex problems” [Foster and Kesselman 2003]. On the one hand, service-oriented Grid architectures need to support dynamic cooperation, negotiation, and adaptive interactions between Web services controlling Grid resources for efficient resource and task allocation and execution. On the other hand, the Grid can facilitate agent communication, life-cycle management, and access to resources for agents. Although the relevance of Grid for agent research and vice versa has been identified in several forums, actual collaborative applications are still in their infancy. In this article, we discuss our recent work on deploying multi-agent negotiation techniques to facilitate dynamic negotiation for Grid resources as a step closer to an adaptive and autonomous Grid. In particular, we describe a Web service development of the Contract Net Protocol for negotiation between insurance companies and repair companies. We evaluate our approach to show the added value of negotiable interactions between Web services as opposed to inflexible single-shot interactions that are currently the state of the art.

This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simultaneous procedure in which the issues are discussed simultaneously but independently of each other, and the sequential procedure in which the issues are discussed one after another. Since each of them yields a different outcome, a key problem is to decide which one to use in which circumstances. Specifically, we consider this question for a model in which the agents have time constraints (in the form of both deadlines and discount factors) and information uncertainty (in that the agents do not know the opponent's utility function). For this model, we consider issues that are both independent and those that are interdependent and determine equilibria for each case for each procedure. In so doing, we show that the package deal is in fact the optimal procedure for each party. We then go on to show that, although the package deal may be computationally more complex than the other two procedures, it generates Pareto optimal outcomes (unlike the other two), it has similar earliest and latest possible times of agreement to the simultaneous procedure (which is better than the sequential procedure), and that it (like the other two procedures) generates a unique outcome only under certain conditions (which we define).

The alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) of Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman is being increasingly widely applied in the specification and verification of open distributed systems and game-like multi-agent systems. In this article, we investigate the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem for ATL. For the case where the set of agents is fixed in advance, this problem was settled at ExpTime-complete in a result of van Drimmelen. If the set of agents is not fixed in advance, then van Drimmelen's construction yields a 2ExpTime upper bound. In this article, we focus on the latter case and define three natural variations of the satisfiability problem. Although none of these variations fixes the set of agents in advance, we are able to prove containment in ExpTime for all of them by means of a type elimination construction—thus improving the existing 2ExpTime upper bound to a tight ExpTime one.

One of the key problems in the design of belief-desire-intention (BDI) agents is that of finding an appropriate policy for intention reconsideration. Crudely, the idea is that at any given time, an agent will have a number of intentions, relating to states of affairs that the agent has committed to bring about. An agent chooses plans that are appropriate for bringing about these intentions; if a particular plan for a given intention fails, then the agent will typically replan, to find an alternative course of action for this intention. However, a rational agent's intentions will not be static. From time-to-time, it makes sense for such an agent to reconsider its intentions, for example when the intention is doomed never to be realized, or else when the agent would simply profit from adopting another, more fruitful goal. This paper presents a detailed investigation of the properties of intention reconsideration. The work builds on the foundational work of Kinny and Georgeff, who investigated the properties of various intention reconsideration strategies in environments that were to varying degrees dynamic, i.e. subject to unanticipated change. The present paper broadly falls into two distinct parts. In the first part, the authors extend work of Kinny and Georgeff, by investigating the properties of intention reconsideration strategies in environments that are also to varying degrees (in)accessible and (non-)deterministic. They then investigate two different models of intention reconsideration. In the first model, intention reconsideration is modelled as a process of discrete deliberation scheduling: intention reconsideration is modelled as an action that may be performed by an agent, and so lends itself to analysis in terms of conventional decision theoretic models of optimal action. In the second, intention reconsideration is modelled as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP): solving the POMDP means finding an optimal intention reconsideration policy.

This paper studies argumentation-based dialogues between agents. It defines a set of locutions by which agents can trade arguments, a set of agent attitudes which relate what arguments an agent can build and what locutions it can make, and a set of protocols by which dialogues can be carried out. The paper then considers some properties of dialogues under the protocols, in particular termination, dialogue outcomes, and complexity, and shows how these relate to the agent attitudes.

Systems composed of interacting autonomous agents offer a promising software engineering approach for developing applications in complex domains. However, this multiagent system paradigm introduces a number of new abstractions and design/development issues when compared with more traditional approaches to software development. Accordingly, new analysis and design methodologies, as well as new tools, are needed to effectively engineer such systems. Against this background, the contribution of this article is twofold. First, we synthesize and clarify the key abstractions of agent-based computing as they pertain to agent-oriented software engineering. In particular, we argue that a multiagent system can naturally be viewed and architected as a computational organization , and we identify the appropriate organizational abstractions that are central to the analysis and design of such systems. Second, we detail and extend the Gaia methodology for the analysis and design of multiagent systems. Gaia exploits the aforementioned organizational abstractions to provide clear guidelines for the analysis and design of complex and open software systems. Two representative case studies are introduced to exemplify Gaia's concepts and to show its use and effectiveness in different types of multiagent system.

Multi-agent systems can very naturally be viewed as computational organisations. For this reason, we believe organisational abstractions offer a promising set of metaphors and models that can be exploited in the analysis and design of such systems. To this end, the concept of role models is increasingly being used to specify and design multi-agent systems. However, this is not the full picture. In this paper we introduce three additional organisational concepts — organisational rules, organisational structures, and organisational patterns — and discuss why we believe they are necessary for the complete specification of computational organisations. In particular, we focus on the concept of organisational rules and introduce a formalism, based on temporal logic, to specify them. This formalism is then used to drive the definition of the organisational structure and the identification of the organisational patterns. Finally, the paper sketches some guidelines for a methodology for agent-oriented systems based on our expanded set of organisational abstractions.

No abstract available.

We present a model of cooperative problem solving that describes the process from its beginning, with some agent recognizing the potential for cooperation with respect to one of its goals, through to team action. Our approach is to characterize the mental states of the agents that lead them to solicit, and take part in, cooperative action. The model is formalized by expressing it as a theory in a quantified multi-modal logic.

A resolution-based proof system for a temporal logic of knowledge is presented and shown to be correct. Such logics are useful for proving properties of distributed and multi-agent systems. Examples are given to illustrate the proof system. An extension of the basic system to the multi-modal case is given and illustrated using the ‘muddy children problem’.

Journal Article Editorial Get access NICK JENNINGS, NICK JENNINGS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar MIKE WOOLDRIDGE, MIKE WOOLDRIDGE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar FAUSTO GIUNCHIGLIA FAUSTO GIUNCHIGLIA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Logic and Computation, Volume 8, Issue 3, June 1998, Pages 231–232, https://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/8.3.231 Published: 01 June 1998

This article describes first steps towards the formal specification and verification of multi-agent systems, through the use of temporal belief logics. The article first describes Concurrent METATEM, a multi-agent programming language, and then develops a logic that may be used to reason about Concurrent METATEM systems. The utility of this logic for specifying and verifying Concurrent METATEM systems is demonstrated through a number of examples. The article concludes with a brief discussion on the wider implications of the work, and in particular on the use of similar logics for reasoning about multi-agent systems in general.